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Tiivistelmä 
 
Diplomityö tutkii tasatariffia hinnoitteluvaihtoehtona Helsingin seudun liikenteessä. Ta-
riffia verrataan vyöhykkeisiin rahoituksen, käyttäjäkokemusten ja muiden kaupunkien 
kokemusten kautta sekä arvioidaan vaikutuksia pienituloisille matkustajille. Tutkimus pe-
rustuu asiantuntija-, henkilö- ja ryhmähaastatteluiden laadulliseen analyysiin sekä hinta-
joustojen ja matkojen kvantitatiiviseen analyysiin. Käyttäytymistaloustieteellisiä vaiku-
tuksia analysoidaan teorian avulla. Tulosten perusteella tasatariffi on toteutettavissa, 
mutta edellyttää lisäsubventioita. Kokemus oikeudenmukaisuudesta liittyy hinnankoro-
tuksiin; jos tasataksa toteutetaan ilman hinnankorotuksia, epäoikeudenmukaisuuden ko-
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taksa ei ole optimaalinen malli tulojen ja käytön maksimoimiseksi, ellei yksinkertaisuu-
den arvo asiakkaalle ole korkea. Yksinkertaisuuden arvon määrittäminen vaatisi kuiten-
kin empiirisiä preferenssitutkimuksia. Työ osoittaa käyttäytymistaloustieteen keskeisen 
roolin hinnoittelussa, ja suunnittelijoiden täytyy hallita kvantitatiiviset menetelmät hin-
noittelun psykologisten ja taloudellisten vaikutusten analysoimiseksi. Johtopäätöksenä 
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1. Introduction 
 
Zone based tariff for public transport (PT) have been used in many European cities for dec-
ades. Recently, zone systems have been simplified or totally removed in few cities, for ex-
ample in Paris, Stockholm and Barcelona. (Massot 2015, UAB 2018, Jarnlo 2013). Re-
moval of zones has resulted either as an aim to simplify tariff system or improve social jus-
tice development or both. Complicated zone models have been felt as barrier for usage, 
since people might experience difficulties to understand zonal system or the business 
logics are difficult to implement for new, customer friendly tariff technologies such as con-
tactless payments. Simplicity attracts even though flat tariff often means price increases to 
many users.  
 
Tariff model is one of the key elements of PT pricing. Small & Verhoef have listed three 
relevant components of tariff: fare level, fare structure and incentive effects of transit sub-
sidies. (Small & Verhoef 2007, l. 8408).  Also, Mulley and Batarce divide the components 
of a fare system to three parts:  fare structure, fare collection system and fare level (Mulley 
& Batarce 2017, pp. 125, 225). Decisions about zones, flat tariff or distance based pricing 
are decisions about fare structure, and one of the most elementary design elements of 
transport planning. 
 
Although, tariff design has crucial role in transport planning, the research on public 
transport tariff is scarce. Transport research has focused much more on general optimizing 
of public transport or strategic planning. (Otto & Boysen 2017, p. 350.) In general, it has 
been proved that theoretically public transport fare should equal social marginal cost to 
produce maximum social welfare (Mohring 1972, Mulley & Batarce 2018) but in practice 
such pricing model would be incomprehensible for passengers (Metsäranta & Hillo 2008, p. 
17). The effects of theoretical marginal pricing for congestion tolls have been computer 
simulated (Kaddoura et al. 2015) but the simulation is based on computer agents, not real 
people or their psychological perceptions about pricing. Some studies have been made 
about ticket productization, i.e., it has been shown, that cheap season tickets can have a 
major impact on the demand for public transport due to zero marginal cost of extra trips. 
(FitzRoy & Smith 1999, p. 236). The relationship between fare and travel distance have 
been studied for profit maximisation (Jørgensen & Preston 2007) but not many studies 
comparing different pricing models exist. Because comparison between different zone-
based tariffs and their ability to maximize revenue has been missing, Otto & Boysen 
showed that introducing two and three zones dramatically increases the revenue compared 
to flat tariff, but the benefit of additional zones quickly decreases if more zones are added 
(Otto & Boysen 2017, pp. 351, 364-365). Jansson and Angell were studying the optimal 
zone model for Oslo region and concluded that based on marginal cost principle, zone 
prices should be higher closer to the city centre where the capacity is in high use, and inner 
zones should be narrower. Flat tariff was found as the ultimate solution for easy under-
standing, but the disadvantage is loss of revenue unless prices are significantly raised for 
inner city, approximately by 30–35 %. (Jansson & Angell 2012, pp. 150-151.) Mathemati-
cians Hamacher and Schöbel have in turn shown that design of zones is NP-hard problem, 
non-deterministic polynomial-time hard (Hamacher & Schöbel 2004, p. 907), which means 
that design of optimal zone modal is not easy and efficient calculation task. 
 
However, public transport tariff studies are mainly mathematically or computationally ori-
ented and lack the empirical data of human experience related to value of simplicity for 
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passenger. As Otto and Boysen remark: “We presuppose perfect knowledge on the custom-
ers’ willingness to pay. In the real world, however, surveying the willingness to pay is 
bound to forecast errors. Forecast errors, problems of the test persons to properly quantify 
their actual willingness to pay, and an aggregation of multiple customers lead to uncer-
tainty” (Otto & Boysen 2017, p. 364). Otto & Boysen left these human errors and reasons 
out of their study and just refer to “long lasting discussions” of these themes in the market-
ing literature. Yet, marketing research and behavioural economics have shown that mental 
accounting matters and psychological observations and emotions, often unconscious and 
irrational, can profoundly change the way people consume, buy and behave (Kahneman & 
Tversky 1984, Thaler 1999, Thaler 2001, Skouras et al. 2005). Marketing and behaviour-
ally oriented research has focused a lot to pricing and buying in consumer businesses 
(Skouras et al. 2005) but these methods have not been used in public transport to same ex-
tent. This is likely due to public service character of PT, and significant role of subsidies in 
financing public transport. Business oriented development has not had similar role in pub-
lic transport planning as in commercial consumer services. Yet, defining how much people 
are willing to pay for easy usage of PT is challenging design problem since usually the 
goal of tariff changes is to increase passenger numbers, avoid revenue losses and to im-
prove passenger experience. Hence, it is desirable to carry out surveys that combine user 
experience and behavioural approach to more traditional economic analysis. 
 
This paper analyses flat tariff as potential tariff solution for Helsinki Region. The effects of 
flat tariff are studied from neoclassical economics perspective estimating sales and demand 
effects, but enriched with qualitative methods of human experience and behavioural eco-
nomics and transport justice analysis of flat tariff. Such comprehensive analysis of flat tar-
iff combining three frameworks (economical, behavioural, justice) has not been done be-
fore, at least not for Helsinki Region. Research is conducted using abductive case method-
ology. Thesis is also the first paper to analyse justice aspect of PT tariff in Helsinki region. 
Furthermore, empirical cases of real implementation of flat tariff in few European cities are 
reviewed.  
 
The research about tariff fairness is an important aspect when designing tariffs (Otto & 
Boysen 2017). Walzer has developed the concept of ‘distributive spheres’ for goods that 
have a special social meaning, and differentiates them from regular goods that can be dis-
tributed on free market. Goods with special social meaning, such as health and education, 
should be taken out of the sphere of free exchange. (Waltzer 1983.) Martens has applied 
Walzer’s theory to transport, and identifies accessibility as the good that should be set 
apart from other goods (Martens 2017, pp. 215-217). The current justice dialogue and re-
search of flat tariff versus zones or distance based tariff relates to transport possibilities of 
low income people, who are most likely using public transport regularly, since they have 
no other option. If it is true that such ‘captive riders’ live far from the city centre in outer 
regions, they suffer poor service level of public transport, worse time budget of mobility 
and are paying significantly more for their accessibility.  Therefore, distance based zone 
pricing can create double or even triple punishment to least well-off people. On the con-
trary, there is evidence that flat tariff could mean higher prices for low income people (Ru-
bensson et al. 2018, Brown 2018). Many concerns are also related to flat tariff such as 
questions of urban sprawl, increased subsidies and experience of fairness. Low travel costs 
of long-distance trips could attract households to access cheaper or more spacious accom-
modation far from the city centre and potentially encourage urban sprawl and growth in car 
use (Massot 2015). 
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This paper shows that flat tariff is an option for HSL region, and the financial effects and 
justice effects are tolerable, if simplicity is chosen to be the main design driver for the re-
gion. Furthermore, flat tariff can improve transport justice for passengers living in the 
outer regions. However, reservations are presented related to optimality of flat tariff, fair-
ness experience of people living in A-zone, ticket revenue maximisation and potential ex-
pansion of HSL region in the future. 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Finnish public transport authority Helsinki Region Transport changed tariff system of the 
metropolitan region in April 2019. The change has been prepared for over decade: work 
started already in 2006, and the first guidelines for the new zone based tariff was approved 
by Helsinki Metropolitan Area Council already in the beginning of 2008 (YTV 2009, p. 
11). The new model was planned to be launched in 2014, but due the technical renewal of 
the travel card system, the introduction of the zones was postponed for five years.  
 
Since 1986, the municipality border defined public transport tickets and pricing (Figure 1). 
Regional tariff has remained basically unchanged over 30 years. Although, municipal bor-
ders are currently abandoned as determinants of the travelling area, the problem of fare 
system border still exists. Within zone system borders are defined by some criteria and 
there can be always discussion about their legitimacy. Especially those people whose home 
or workplace locates on the more expensive side of the border, may ask justification for 
chosen solution.  
 
Helsinki region comprises of 14 municipalities, and currently nine of them are members of 
HSL, Helsinki Region Transport. The region has had a common tariff for public transport 
starting from 1986. HSL was established in 2009, when City of Helsinki and regional 
transport authority merged their planning operations. Emerge of common authority for 
whole region has accelerated the regional planning and development of regional transport 
services and zonal pricing, which was launched in April 2019 (Figure 2). 
 
Helsinki region is transferring to zones much later that many other European metropolitan 
areas. The urbanization of the region has occurred later than elsewhere in Europe, and re-
gion has still only a moderate number of inhabitants. The planning of the zones started al-
ready in 2006, but the final implementation actualized in the spring 2019. The long imple-
mentation phase was caused partly due to heavy political decision-making process between 
municipalities and partly due to delay in renewal of ticketing system.  
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Figure 1. Tariff setting in HSL region before the launch of zones in 2019. Source: HSL 
 
The area of HSL accounts for 2031 km², which is divided to four zones: A-zone 48 km², B-
zone 264 km², C-zone 491 km² and D-zone 1228 km².  Currently, 1,2 million people live in 
the area, but the population continues to grow at an annual rate of about 1,4 %.  In 2030 the 
region is expected to inhabit 1,6 million people and by 2050 2 million people (HSL 2018). 
B-zone is the most habited one, and roughly 50 % of all HSL residents live in this zone. 
Yet, A-zone is the most densely populated; 5400 people live on square kilometre by aver-
age. A is twice as dense as B-zone and over 20 times denser than D-zone. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Zone-based tariff system of HSL. Source: HSL. 
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Table 1. Inhabitants of municipalities and zones in HSL region 1.1.2017. Source: HSL. 
 
INHABITANTS OF 
HSL REGION           
Municipality A B C D Together 
Espoo  158 266 111 543  269 809 
Helsinki 260 178 356 109 2 284  618 571 
Kauniainen  9 004 250  9 254 
Kerava    34 932 34 932 
Kirkkonummi    38 498 38 498 
Sipoo   450 19 231 19 681 
Siuntio    6 042 6 042 
Tuusula   582 37 298 37 880 
Vantaa  84 778 130 704 249 215 731 
Together:  260 178 608 157 245 813 136 250 1 250 398 
 
1.2 Research questions   
 
The motivation for this study is rising from existing discourse about zones especially from 
city of Espoo but also from Vantaa, surrounding municipalities and Helsinki, people living 
in A-zone. Complaints are contradictory: inhabitants of C-zone are expressing feel of in-
justice, since their neighbours living in same city but in a different zone are paying less for 
PT. People living in A-zone are complaining about the loss of cheap tram ticket and high 
price for short trips, since the regional zone system has no special tickets for different 
transport modes. City authorities from Espoo have already said B-zone need to cover all 
Espoo areas inside Ring Road III, when the extension of west metro line is finished. Espoo 
aims placing all five areal centres, Tapiola, Leppävaara, Matinkylä, Espoonlahti and Es-
poon keskus, to B-zone (Espoo 2018, p. 3). West metro extension is expected to be ready 
in 2024. If this change will take place, it has effect on Vantaa and Helsinki as well, since 
neighbouring cities would likely demand expansion of B-zone in north and east as well. As 
a result, all three cities and the city of Kauniainen would locate in AB-zones and there 
would be de facto a flat tariff for metropolitan region. This would practically mean disap-
pearance of current C-zone, since there are only few people living in Espoo outside Ring 
Rail III. The objective of this study is to analyse flat tariff (Figure 3) as potential tariff so-
lution for the whole region. Thesis defines strengths and weaknesses of flat tariff and anal-
yses criteria to consider when planning tariff systems.  
 
 
 
The research questions are addressed as follows:  
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1. What are motives and experiences for flat tariff in different cities? 
2. How HSL-customers see flat tariff? What elements make it attractive/non-attractive? 
3. What effects flat tariff could have for ticket revenues, subsidies and usage of public 
transport in HSL region? 
4. What effects flat tariff have for least well-off people in HSL region? 
5. What frameworks public transport organisations should utilize when they are planning 
tariff and pricing strategies? 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Potential flat tariff for whole HSL region. 
 
1.3 The structure of the research 
 
Chapter two reviews the current theoretical literature about public transport pricing and 
pricing psychology as well research about transport justice. Main reviewed disciplines in-
clude transport economics, behavioural economics, marketing and justice philosophy and 
transport justice. Chapter three describes the methods applied in this study. The methodo-
logical framework is based on abductive logic and systematic combining to create rich and 
multidimensional picture of the surveyed case. The qualitative and quantitative results are 
presented in chapter four. Finally, the results of the different approaches and theoretical lit-
erature are combined in chapter five, which constructs a case analysis of flat tariff in HSL 
region. Chapter six concludes how the findings can be applied for current tariff planning 
and for future research. 
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2. Theory and literature review 
 
This thesis operates in the middle ground of transport economics, behavioural economics 
and marketing. Transport economics is a discipline focusing on transport resource alloca-
tions and the interactions among independent agents in the markets (Small & Verhoef 
2007, l. 161). Behavioural economics is the combination of psychology and economics that 
investigates what happens in markets, when some of the agents display human limitations 
and complications (Mullainathan & Thaler 2000, p. 2). Definition of marketing has 
evolved during the decades but currently American Marketing Association defines market-
ing and marketing research as “the activity, set of institutions, and processes for creating, 
communicating, delivering, and exchanging offerings that have value for customers, cli-
ents, partners, and society at large. Marketing research is the function that links the con-
sumer, customer, and public to the marketer through information” (AMA 2013). These 
three disciplines give an overall framework for this paper, but there are also questions re-
lated to service design and transport justice, when thinking about the question of flat tariff 
in public transport. This thesis tries to build bridges among different research fields, which 
all have something to say to the question whether flat price would be appropriate solution 
for public transport services. 
 
2.1 Fare structure 
 
Mulley and Batarce categorize fare structures broadly into three categories: flat fares, zonal 
fares and distance-based fares. The most suitable fare structure depends on evaluation cri-
teria for the public transport system. They list six different criteria for fare structure: 
 
1. Ease of understanding for passengers 
2. Simplicity of collection 
3. Ability to generate the required revenue 
4. Ease to control fares (particularly from evasion by passengers) 
5. Equitability  
6. Attractiveness to passengers 
 
(Mulley & Batarce 2017, pp. 125, 225) 
 
Flat tariff 
 
Flat tariff is against principle of price differentiation. Yet there many positive aspects in 
flat tariff: it is easy to understand, simple to collect and can be attractive, especially to long 
trip passengers. If payment is not related to length of trip, it can be economically ineffi-
cient. Yet there can also be situations, where flat tariff is more expensive in long distances 
than pure marginal social cost would be (Kaddoura et al. 2015, p.215.) It can also be expe-
rienced unfair. Flat fare might set price level so high that very short PT rides are substi-
tuted by walking or cycling. Therefore, it can significantly reduce revenue. Although, flat 
fare can be a good fare structure in cities where there is small deviation in the average dis-
tance travelled. (Mulley and Batarce 2018, p. 126.) 
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Distance-based tariff 
 
Distance-based fares are normally related to the line of travel rather than geography, so 
that the further the distance travelled the greater is the fare. This tariff is often used in long-
distance transport services. Many of the disadvantages of distance-based fares can be over-
come with more technologically advanced fare-collection systems. Need to raise revenues 
for the public transport system requires cities to have distance-based fares because of their 
enhanced revenue-raising ability. (Mulley and Batarce 2018, p. 126.) However, it has been 
shown that cumulative zone pricing with just few zones outperforms flat tariff and distance 
based pricing (Otto & Boyse 2017, p. 365). Yet, this tariff can also be inequitable: usually 
passengers living further from the city centre have also greater waiting and travel times and 
higher prices can be felt as extra punishment. Mulley and Batarce evaluate also that dis-
tance-based fares can lead to complicated fare structures while passengers seek simplicity.  
 
Zones 
 
Zonal-based fare is crude form of distance-based fare. There is typically a single fare ap-
plying to intrazonal journeys and higher fares when travelling over multiple zones. Since it 
can be challenging if short trip travellers end up crossing zone boundaries, many cities 
with zonal systems have overlapping zones. In contrast to distance-based fares, zonal fares 
are based on the geographical relationship between origin and destination. The best zonal 
fare structures are those which have natural boundaries between zones, which makes zonal 
fares more attractive to passengers. (Mulley & Batarce 2018, p. 126.) The fewer zones, the 
more understandable the tariff is. 
 
Usually zonal model collects more revenue than flat tariff. However, a comprehensive re-
search of different zone‐based tariffs and their ability to maximize the transport operator's 
revenue have been missing. In their study, Otto & Boysen showed, that the positive effects 
of additional zones to ticket revenues quickly diminishes. Introducing two and three zones 
dramatically increases the revenue, but the benefit of extra zones decreases the more zones 
are added. In turn, fewer zones ease the communication and customer’s acceptance of tar-
iffs. (Otto & Boysen 2017.) 
 
2.2 Pricing  
 
The classic economic assumption is that suppliers set prices to maximize their profits, 
which on perfect markets and in the private companies equals private marginal cost and 
private marginal benefit. Yet, revenues of urban public transport hardly ever cover the 
costs of service production in modern motorized cities. After 1950’s automobile industry 
increased rapidly in America as in Europe which had dramatic effects on public transit 
markets. After World War II public transit was largely privately owned in USA, but soon 
companies went out of business and many cities were left without service. Transit opera-
tions were falling into public hands as cities tried to rescue them from bankruptcy and 
maintain service for their citizens. For nearly 30 years transit finance has been dependent 
on public subsidies. (Wachs 1989, p. 1545.)  
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Free priced, unregulated public transport leads to high prices, limited supply and deviation 
from optimal use of resources. When the aim of pricing is to allocate resource that maxim-
izes the social welfare rather than just the welfare of the supplier, some controls and incen-
tives may by applied in the form of subsidies or taxes. (Elgar & Kennedy 2005, p. 72.) 
Therefore, both operational losses and investments are funded by subsidies, and transport 
service is sold below unit costs with social marginal cost. There are also other arguments 
for PT subsidies. Public transport has positive external effects, such as distribution of ac-
cessibility, environmental impacts of the transport system and health. Also, equal treatment 
of car and public transport favours public transport subsidizing because motoring is sup-
ported many ways as well. (Metsäranta & Hillo 2008, pp. 17-18.) 
 
Public transport operates in falling marginal costs and economics of scale. Short run mar-
ginal cost is the cost of producing additional units of a good or service with additional vari-
able inputs and their costs usually related to labour, material and energy. In the short run, 
all the fixed costs remain stable. In the long run, all costs are considered variable (Sexton 
R. et al. 1993, p. 34). In figure 4, the average cost of producing public transport is AC as 
the number of passengers increases. Costs include the demand for profit of the operator. 
Passengers’ willingness to pay for public transport is demand curve D. Without a subsidy, 
the public transport service is priced according to the average cost (p '), to cover all costs. 
The number of trips is q'. The social marginal cost SMC is lower than average cost, which 
is due to the positive effects of demand growth described above. The optimal number of 
trips is q. This requires that the cost of the trip is p, and the coloured area is covered by a 
subsidy. Subsidy increases the surplus of passengers (skewed area). 
 
 
Figure 4. Falling social marginal cost of public transport and need for subsidies 
(Metsäranta & Hillo 2008, p. 19). 
 
The major difference between regulated public pricing and prices chosen by privately 
owned firms is that a regulator attempts to choose prices intended to maximize consumer 
welfare, whereas unregulated firms choose prices to maximize profit (Shy 1995, p. 341). 
Figure 5 illustrates how social welfare maximum is not received and deadweight loss oc-
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curs if the price is too high. When price is at P0, the consumer surplus equals A and reve-
nues minus cost equals B, so total welfare (supplier+consumer) is W = A + B. The area as-
sociated with Y is a deadweight loss associated with higher than social marginal cost pric-
ing. When the price is reduced from P0 to P1, which equals social marginal cost, then total 
welfare increases and W = A + B + Y. (Mattson & Ripplinger 2011, p.4.) 
 
 
Figure 5. Marginal cost pricing and social welfare (Modified from Mattson & Ripplinger 
2011, p.4). 
 
Unlike in many other businesses, passengers play also a producing, not just consuming role 
in transportation business. People must supply their own time to the production process. In 
transport economics, price of a trip equals charged fare, the value the traveller attaches to 
the travel, waiting and access time. (Mohring, 1972, p. 591). The cost of trip decreases if 
more individuals use public transport. since growing demand increases frequencies and 
shortens waiting times. The phenomenon is called Mohring effect. When the number of us-
ers increase, others benefit with positive externalities creating better service level with 
lower prices. Because users do not consider these contributions to others when making 
travelling decisions, the appropriate fare must be lower than the production marginal cost. 
(Mulley & Batarce 2018, p. 133.)  
 
It can be argued that the use of private vehicles in congested areas in peak hours is priced 
below marginal cost, since drivers are not paying for their negative externalities. One more 
argument for transport subsidies is the absence of road pricing. The argument is weakened 
because of the very low cross-elasticities that has been found between private vehicles and 
transit modes, as low as 0.02. These low cross-elasticities suggest that even very low 
transit fares will not ensure optimal resource allocation. Paying full price for their car ex-
ternalities would likely be more efficient than subsidizing transit. Until marginal pricing is 
applied on all the transportation sectors, the second-best solution for transit seems to be 
subsidies than a transportation system without subsidies. (Elgar & Kennedy 2005, pp 73-
74.) 
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Pure marginal cost pricing principle would lead to fare structure where all fares should be 
related to the distance travelled, demand, peak-time and more complicated things. For ex-
ample, high-season passengers should pay the marginal operational plus the marginal ca-
pacity costs, whereas low-season consumers pay only the marginal operational cost (Shy, 
1995, p. 351). In real world, public transport is not priced at social marginal cost, which 
would be the best option in utilitarian economics. Usually only time of day and trip dis-
tance are considered as principle for price differentiation and even they are often ignored 
for simplicity (Small & Verhoef 2007, l. 8506).  
 
If price would vary extremely elastically depending on time, place, demand and many 
other factors, tariff would be difficult to define and hard for passengers to understand. Sim-
plicity of the system and simple information is one valid design element for tariff system 
(Metsäranta & Hillo, 2008, p. 17). Therefore, transport service providers look for second-
best options such as zonal pricing, distance-based tariff or flat tariff. Yet, some marginal 
cost pricing principles should be remembered, when planning tariff system. Jansson and 
Angell were studying the optimal the zone model for Oslo region and find that: 1) marginal 
cost price is dependent on riding time; 2) the boarding cost grows with the load at the 
boarding stop; 3) the crowding cost grows with the load when riding and is proportional to 
riding time; 4) the producer's marginal cost is higher in peak than off-peak periods. They 
concluded that based on marginal cost principle, zone prices should be higher closer to the 
city centre where the capacity use is higher and inner zones should be narrower. (Jansson 
& Angell 2012.) Figure 6 illustrates this principle for a route from the outskirts to the city 
centre. The thickness of the black line illustrates the in-vehicle congestion and thus also the 
price for various sections of the route. The inner zone represents the city centre and the 
zones grow larger with the distance from the centre. Travelling close to the city centre 
where capacity use is higher than in the outskirts will then mean higher optimal fares (Fig-
ure 6). (Jansson & Angell, 2012, pp. 150-151). 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 6. Principal of fare differentiation and zones (Jansson &Angell 2012, p. 151). 
 
Jansson and Angell studied six different zone models one of which (A5) was a flat tariff 
model. Flat tariff was described as impossible due to revenue losses and fairness problems.  
“A5 is of course the ultimate solution due to easy understanding. But the disadvantages are 
likely easy to explain. Primarily it gives a much larger loss of revenue unless one signifi-
cantly raises the prices for those who only travel within Oslo city... it could be possible in-
troduce a unit-zone-fare by increasing the price for the shortest trips by approximately 30–
35%. All other trips would be cheaper than originally. Of course, it would be very hard to 
get acceptance for higher prices within Oslo city… Our conclusion is, not surprisingly, that 
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large areas with a unit-zone fare is not possible from a practical point of view. And then we 
have not taken into account that this would stress fairness views even more than for the 
other alternatives.” (Jansson & Angell 2012, pp. 150-151.) 
 
The researches end up recommending option of six zones compared to 88 zones of that 
time. To achieve the same or more revenues with fewer zones but minimum number of 
passenger losses they recommend raising the fares according to Ramsey principle: raise the 
fares of trips with low price elasticity and reduce the fares of trips with relatively high 
price elasticity. Proposed system meant substantial price reductions for longer journeys, 
while increasing the prices within the city of Oslo only marginally. (Jansson & Angell 
2012, pp. 150-151). Recommended pricing change would shift the tariff system closer to-
wards flat tariff as the price differences between centre and outskirts narrow. However, the 
political opinion emphasized that travellers within Oslo must not lose too much.  
 
Economist William Vickrey, famous for his work with congestion pricing has also con-
cluded that ideally public transit as well as other transport services should be priced based 
on marginal costs and charge fares on the basis of origin, destination, routing and time-of-
day in close conformity to marginal cost (Small & Verhoef 2007, l. 8506). “Ideally, if re-
distributive considerations were unimportant, if fares could be made as variable as desired 
without increasing the costs of fare collection, if reactions of passengers to variable fares 
were unconfused and rational, if competing modes of transportation were being made to 
pay charges according to their appropriate marginal cost, and if there existed a method of 
taxation both acceptable to the public and free of undesirable side-effects, then it would be 
proper to charge prices as close as possible to marginal cost“ (Vickrey 1980, p. 393). There 
are many if’s in one sentence and as Vickrey recognizes, pure marginal cost pricing would 
not be simple, would need sophisticated methods of fare collection and would seem cus-
tomers as somewhat bizarre. Vickrey recognizes the mental side of tariff; passengers might 
not react to marginal cost pricing as rationally as economists would want them. The con-
clusions of marginal cost pricing principles for public transport could be summarized that 
it is not feasible as such. However, good tariff should follow some SMC principles: PT 
prices should follow both the demand curve and the cost curve and prices should be high-
est, where and when the demand and costs are highest, including external costs.  
 
Mathematicians Hamacher and Schöbel studied design problem of zone tariff using com-
putational complexity theory, and found that the design of zones, is NP hard (Hamacher & 
Schöbel 2004, p. 907). NP hardness means that solving problem by computing becomes 
very soon enormous calculating task. Most famous NP hard problem is travel salesman 
problem, where there is set of cities and the problem is to find a shortest route that goes 
through each city. The number of such routes grows very quickly with the number of cit-
ies. As IBM’s chief architecture writes: “the number of circuits is = (n-1)(n-2)...For 16 cit-
ies there are more than a trillion circuits.  For 10,000 cities this number is about 1035657. 
There is no way one can compute the shortest circuit for 10,000 cities this way, even using 
the fastest available computing grid for a century.” (Puget, 2013.) Similarly, calculating the 
optimal zone structure based on PT network nodes becomes impossible task, and therefore 
Hamacher and Schöbel ended up using different heuristic methods in their study. 
 
The price elasticity of public transport fares refers to the responsiveness of demand for 
tickets to changes in their prices. Rider sensitivity to fare changes have been studied a lot, 
and in general, if fares are increased, patronage will decrease (Balcomb et al. 2004, pp.15, 
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49). The price elasticity is based on empirical data, and the concept has been used widely 
also in marketing (Tellis 1988, p. 332), which has always been more psychologically ori-
ented than economics and borrowed many theoretical foundations from psychology and 
particularly the field of perception (Skouras et al. 2005, p. 364). Ticket sales have also im-
pact from cross elasticity with other modes of transport such as car driving 
 
The value of the price elasticity is the ratio of the proportional change in patronage to the 
proportional change in fares. It has a negative value when fares and patronage are inversely 
related: an increase in fares leads to a decrease in patronage and vice versa. If the value of 
the elasticity is in the range zero to -1, then a fare increase will lead to increased revenue. 
If the value exceeds -1, then a fare increase will lead to decreased revenue. Fare elasticities 
are dynamic and varying over time. Therefore, it is common to distinguish between short-
run and long-run elasticity values, usually short-run to be 1 or 2 years, and long-run to be 
around 12 to 15. (Balcomb et al. 2004, p. 15.) In literature reviews, short-run price elastici-
ties of tickets vary between -0.2 and -0.5. In the long run, price elasticities are significantly 
higher.  The realisation that long-term elasticities can exceed -1 has serious implications 
for the public transport industry. While the immediate effect of a fare rise might increase 
revenue, the long-term effect is likely to be a decrease. Attempts to prevent falling revenue 
with fare increases will eventually fail. (Paulley et al. 2006, p. 297.)  
 
Service quality (speed, frequency, coverage, and comfort) and parking pricing tend to have 
the greatest impact on transit ridership. Elasticity appears to decrease with increasing city 
size and in the city centre due to increased traffic congestion, parking costs and improved 
transit service due to economies of scale. Elasticity decreases, when transit has a competi-
tive service and good price position in contrast to car. Elasticities appear to increase some-
what as fare levels increase. (Litman 2004, p. 40.) Off-peak transit ridership exhibits 
roughly twice the sensitivity to fare changes of peak period ridership. (McCollom & Pratt, 
2004, p. 6). Elasticity for same journey purpose can vary as potential new users may have 
different perceptions of using public transport. Those who have access to a car have more 
alternatives than those without. Males tend to have higher elasticity values than females. 
This may be partly because they are more likely to have a car available. Transit dependent 
riders ‘captive riders’ are generally less price sensitive than discretionary riders. People 
with low incomes tend to be more transit dependent. People travelling to work or to school 
generally have little choice of trip ends or timing of journeys. Hence elasticities tend to be 
lower than for other trip purposes. Evidence has been found to support the idea that elastic-
ities are higher for very short and very long trips, and lower for medium-length ones. 
(Paulley, N. et al. 2006, p.299.)  One interesting finding in price elasticity studies relates to 
direction of price changes. Transportation demand models often apply the same elasticity 
value to both price increases and reductions, but there is evidence that change is not sym-
metric and fare increases tend to cause a greater reduction in ridership than the same size 
fare reduction will increase ridership (Litman 2004. p. 40). This refers to occurrence of 
loss aversion phenomenon in PT price elasticities.  
 
In the Helsinki metropolitan area price elasticity studies have been conducted in 1999 and 
2014. The study in 2014 by HSL examined changes in ticket sales in 2005-2013 as well as 
other factors related to the use of public transport. The time series models assume that de-
mand for tickets depends on ticket prices, various background variables and demand at an 
earlier stage. Time series models were also used in this study to estimate effect of flat tar-
iff. (HSL 2014, p. 7.)  
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Traditional economists assume that buyers behave rationally, their preferences are stable 
and they act to maximize the utility from their purchases. Based on rational markets, it is 
possible to derive the law of demand, i.e. the quantity demanded of any good if its price 
changes. Economist theories remind that these laws apply when market information is per-
fect, competition is perfect and all other things are kept equal and only variables keep 
changing. This is hardly ever the case and already the change in price already changes the 
budget of consumer and often the prices of substitutes sold by competitors. (Skouras et al. 
2005, p. 363.) 
The weakest part of the traditional economic theory is the concept of utility‐maximization 
by rational consumers. Utility-maximization is result of neoclassical economics where per-
fectly competitive markets and rational consumers and companies leads to a social opti-
mum of prices. Most people have everyday experience that seem to contradict such princi-
ples, but also the work of psychologists and behavioural economics experiments have 
shown that rationality and utility‐maximization can hardly be considered as universal traits 
of consumer behaviour. (Skouras et al. 2005, Kahneman 1994, Thaler 1999, 2001.)  
Behavioural economists have rejected the strict rationality in human decision‐making. 
They found their approach on the pioneering work of psychologists Kahneman and 
Tversky (Skouras et al. 2005, p.364.) One important finding of Kahneman and Tversky 
was that people value gains and losses differently, feeling the pain of losses of as double 
time heavier than similar amount gain (Figure 7 and 8). Thus, prospect theory has become 
one of the key components in behavioural economics. Kahneman and Tversky showed that 
the actions of human beings deviate from the rationality of traditional economics. People 
make systematic errors of judgment and these insights led to the rise of a new field, behav-
ioural economics. Behavioural economics does not imply that neoclassical approach of 
utility maximisation, equilibrium and efficiency should be rejected but those theoretical 
frameworks should be tested in empirical world and based on the results new theories 
could be suggested (Camerer et al. 2004, p.3).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Dilbert understands loss aversion (Behavioural Strategy Group, 2016). 
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Figure 8. The value function of losses and gains show that a loss is more aversive than a 
gain of same amount is attractive (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984, p. 342). 
 
These findings can have profound effects on the question of PT tariff. It is likely that peo-
ple, who are experiencing price increases due to flat tariff, are actually suffering more than 
the ones enjoying the price decreases. Loss aversion can have strong impact on political 
decision makers but also to final results of tariff changes. If operators or authorities under-
estimate reaction to loss aversion, they can experience unexpected losses.  
 
Behavioural economist Richard Thaler contend that people are not just irrational but pre-
dictably irrational. Thaler’s work has studied irrational effects of ownership, confidence, 
and a sense of fairness. Together with Daniel Kahneman, Thaler showed “endowment ef-
fect”: people place a higher value on what they already possess. Also, traditional econom-
ics assume more information lead to better decision-making, but instead Thaler found that 
the more information people acquire, the more overconfident they feel about their ability to 
make decision, which can lead to poorer decisions. Thaler’s research showed also that peo-
ple have firm standards of fairness. Because most consumers do not know what goods are 
actually worth of, they determine value based on what seems fair. If they got feeling they 
are being gouged, it might discourage sales in ways that have nothing to do with the utility 
of the goods. (Thompson 2017.) 
 
Another interesting behavioural economics concept is mental accounting. Mental account-
ing is the set of cognitive operations used by people to organize, evaluate, and keep track 
of financial activities. Both the sources and uses of funds are labelled and grouped into cat-
egories (housing, food, etc.) in this mental accounting system and spending is sometimes 
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constrained by implicit or explicit budgets. Accounts can be balanced daily, weekly, yearly 
and can be defined narrowly or broadly. (Thaler, 1999, p.183.) Mental accounting can have 
profound effects for tickets products. For example, if money is freed from mental transport 
account due to price decreases, the money would most likely be spent to some other 
transport services but still inside the same account.  
 
Behavioural economics have shown, that people choose flat-rate prices even if it be would 
more rational for them to not pay fixed sum. This flat-rate bias is relevant phenomenon 
when comparing flat tariff for example to pure distance based tariff, which has no prepaid 
tickets. Flat prepayment decouples the purchase from the consumption and doing so seems 
to reduce the perceived cost of the activity. The cost of including extra services to the pre-
paid price will look relatively small when combined with other costs compared to a nega-
tive transaction utility if paid separately. Another disadvantage of the pay-per-use pricing 
policy is that it links the payment and the consumption very noticeably. Consumers don't 
like the experience of “having the meter running”. Most telephone customers elect a flat-
rate service because they seem to value flat-rate over measured service even when the bill 
would be the same. Similarly, health clubs typically charge members by the month or year 
rather than of a per-use basis. This strategy decouples usage from fees, making the mar-
ginal cost of a visit zero. (Thaler 1999, p. 192.)  
 
Lambrecht and Skiera list four possible factors behind the flat-rate bias. First one is called 
“insurance effect”: consumers may choose a flat-rate to avoid variation in their monthly 
billing rate to avoid the risk of high costs in periods of greater-than-average usage. Second 
one is “taxi meter effect”: consumers may enjoy their usage more on a flat-rate than on a 
pay-per-use tariff. This is the case where taxi meter reduces the pleasure of a taxi ride. 
Mental accounting (Thaler 1999) assumes that paying per use lessens the joy from con-
sumption because of the pain of paying to consume at the time of usage. In contrast, paying 
a flat fee decouples payment and usage, which can be enjoyed as if it were free. “Conven-
ience effect” appears if consumers believe that choosing optional tariffs is inconvenient 
and try to avoid the effort of identifying alternative tariffs. To minimize information cost, 
they might choose the tariff that seems to be the “default tariff”. Consumers may also over-
estimate their demand for a good, “overestimation effect”. (Lambrecht & Skiera 2006, pp. 
213-222.) 
 
Lambrecht and Skiera also found that underestimation of usage leads to the pay-per-use 
bias. Consumers with pay-per-use bias have a much higher likelihood to churn and they are 
unhappy with their tariff choice. (Lambrecht and Skiera 2006, pp. 213-222.) A classical 
utility maximisation theory would say that consumers having flat-rate would consume until 
their marginal utility of consumption is zero and the flat fee should not have any impact on 
consumption. Thaler made the notion that individuals derive utility from feeling as if they 
have gotten a good deal. His work decomposes the total utility from purchasing a good into 
acquisition utility and transaction utility. Acquisition utility is determined by the con-
sumer’s valuation of consuming the good minus the money used in acquiring the good. 
Transaction utility is the value to the individual of obtaining a good deal on the purchase of 
the item. Thaler suggests consumers feel better off when they have paid a low average 
price for the goods consumed. (Thaler 1999.) Results are particularly important in a flat 
rate context where increasing consumption decreases the price per unit. Thus, if consumers 
are strongly motivated by transaction utility, they may increase their consumption in flat 
tariff to get a better deal. Research on causes of the pay-per-use bias is limited because the 
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pay-per-use bias has hardly been observed. There are suggests that a risk-averse consumer 
who does not know his or her future income might prefer a pay-per-use tariff, even if it 
costs more on average than a flat rate. (Lambrecht and Skiera 2006, p. 214.)  
 
Just and Wansink have shown that individuals in a flat-rate context indeed may consume 
the amount that enables them to get their money's worth. If flat price is increased, people 
consume more and the other way around. (Just & Wansink 2011.) In flat-rate context of 
monthly tickets, price reduction may not always be the best solution to promote the usage 
among existing customers even though it attracts new customers. Zero valued transaction 
utility and mental budgeting for transport costs are probably one explanations to very poor 
impacts of a free-fare public transport policy in Tallinn. An analysis has shown that totally 
free public transport increased the demand in Tallinn only 1,2 % (Cats et al. 2014). When 
transport service is free, there is no value to use it and saved money can be spent on other 
transport services such as taxis or car. People should be aware of costs because it makes 
them consume more. This sunk-cost effect, tendency to continue consuming if people have 
invested time or money or some resource in it, makes consumers use products, what they 
have paid for to avoid feeling of waisted money (Figure 9). Such pricing tactics that mask 
prices reduce pressure on buyers to use the product or service and can decrease the likeli-
hood of usage. Members who paid monthly used the gym most consistently making this 
pricing model the most likely to generate membership renewals. (Gourville & Soman 
2002, p. 94.) 
 
Figure 9. Analysis of health club's records showed that consumption closely follows the 
timing of payments (Gourville & Soman 2002, p. 94). 
 
One example of flat rate bias in PT can be found in the German city of Freiburg, which has 
experienced an enormous and unprecedented rise in the demand for local public transport. 
A study investigated the causes of this dramatic increase over the decade since 1984, and 
the main explanation was cheap travel pass with unlimited use at zero marginal financial 
cost, interpersonal transferability and wide regional validity. The expansion in public 
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transport trip demand was achieved without any long-term deterioration in the operating 
deficit of the municipal transport company. (Fizroy & Smith 1998.) 
 
Contrary to traditional economics, lack of belief in perfect rationality or full information 
has been a characteristic of consumer behaviour studies in marketing. Consumers have 
been analysed for decades in marketing field through theoretical frameworks which have 
been borrowed from psychology and the field of perception. Since marketing has no strong 
theoretical core, it has been open towards other disciplines while mathematically highly 
developed economics has focused to the development of theories (Skouras et al. 2005, pp. 
366, 371.) The difference in the treatment of pricing between marketing and economics 
can be explained by the differences in the origin, mission and evolution (Figure 10). 
 
 
Economics  Marketing 
 
Figure 10. A comparison between the economics and the marketing literature on pricing. 
(Skouras et al. 2005, p.370.) 
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Wilkie and Moore distinguish four eras of marketing (Wilkie & Moore 2003, p. 117).  
  
0. “Pre-Marketing” (Before 1900): No distinguishing field of study. 
1. “Founding the Field” (1900–1920): Development of first courses with “marketing” 
in title. Focus on marketing as distribution. 
2. “Formalizing the Field” (1920–1950): Development of generally accepted founda-
tions or “principles of marketing.” First professional association, conferences, jour-
nals. 
3. “A Paradigm Shift—Marketing, Management, and the Sciences” (1950–1980). 
Two perspectives emerge to dominate the marketing mainstream: (1) the manage-
rial viewpoint and (2) the behavioural and quantitative. 
4. “The Shift Intensifies—A Fragmentation of the Mainstream” (1980–present). New 
challenges arise in business world: short-term financial focus, downsizing, globali-
zation, and reengineering.  
 
Management science and behavioural science emerged into the marketing during the 
1950’s and 1960’s (Wilkie & Moore 2003, pp. 125-126). The Journal of Consumer Re-
search was founded in 1974, The Journal of Psychology and Marketing ten years later in 
1984 and Journal of Consumer Psychology in 1995. Organizers of Journal of Marketing 
have presented four fundamental issues to distinguish field of marketing from other disci-
plines, and direct further research: (1) How do customers and consumers really behave? (2) 
How do markets function and evolve? (3) How do firms relate to markets? (4) What are the 
contributions of marketing to organizational performance and societal welfare? (Day & 
Montgomery 1999, p.1.) Marketing and behavioural economics both accept human behav-
iour as it occurs, and are more interested in to study mental processes through empirical 
data instead of mathematical formula.   
 
Classical marketing mix of 4 P´s was created by E. Jerome McCarthy in 1960’s. He di-
vided marketing into four sets of activities: price, promotion, place and product. Price is 
perceived value of the product to the customer instead of true costs of product or service. If 
product has positive customer value, it may be priced higher than its monetary value. Pricing 
is important and should consider fixed and variable costs, competition, company objec-
tives, proposed positioning and target group. An organisation can adopt several pricing 
strategies based on its objectives. (Ahuja 2016). However, marketers consider price as only 
one feature affecting buyers’ decisions and even not the most important one. There are em-
pirical studies in marketing, which have shown that other criteria such as reliability, ser-
vice quality, time delivery and fame are often regarded as more important than price when 
selecting a vendor. (Skouras et al. 2005.) Economists would call these things as utility or 
value of the product or service.  
 
Buyers tend to associate a higher price with a higher quality and perceive price differences 
in proportional rather than in absolute term. Furthermore, presentation of prices may alter 
reference prices, so adding high-priced product to the product line increases the buyers’ 
reference prices, making the remaining products in the product line look less expensive. 
Consumers either contrast or assimilate the price levels with their reference prices. Very 
high price cut might not be judged positively because it might signify a decrease in the 
product’s quality. (Skouras et al. 2005.) Industry of public transport has not applied all po-
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tential marketing strategies due to its public service character. However, many pricing ob-
servations from marketing and behavioural economics should be utilized, when planning 
PT prices, product category and tariff setting. 
 
2.3 System and justice effects 
 
Pricing literature has presented, how different pricing strategies can impact on demand and 
consumer behaviour of PT. Yet, pricing is not the only and perhaps not even the most criti-
cal factor, when passenger is making the decision of PT usage. It is suggested that most be-
haviours of consumer are only partly voluntary and depending on consumer motivation. 
Some behaviour demand abilities like knowledge, skills and resources that are not availa-
ble to everyone, and some external conditions or opportunities may promote or prevent 
travelling by public transportation. John Thøgersen has constructed MOA (motivation, op-
portunity, ability) model for consumer action that considers both the direct behavioural ef-
fects of opportunity and ability constraints. (Thøgersen 2009.) Figure 11 shows that even if 
consumer has the motivation to take PT trip, some constraints in abilities or opportunities 
might prevent behaviour to take place. If some people are experiencing significant re-
strictions in transport resources or opportunities, they can suffer transport injustice or even 
transport poverty. 
 
 
Figure 11. Motivation, opportunity, ability (MOA) model for the use of public transporta-
tion (Thøgersen 2009). 
 
Justice of flat tariff can be reviewed from two different perspective: does flat tariff feel fair 
and is it fair? Three criteria have been found that people use in their fairness judgments. 
(1) They care about being treated fairly and treating others fairly. (2) They are willing to 
resist unfair firms. (3) They have systematic implicit rules that specify which actions of 
firms are considered unfair. Furthermore, the most important lesson was that the rules of 
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perceived fairness cannot be reasoning from economic principles or from intuition but de-
mands a true behavioural data from the customers. (Kahneman et al. 1986.) 
 
Many studies have been carried about perceived fairness also in the field of public 
transport (Xia et al. 2004). The survey administered among young people in Copenhagen 
and Lisbon showed that higher perceived fairness relates positively to higher perceived 
quality of transit service and higher perceived ease of paying for transit use. Higher per-
ceived spatial equity is also associated with higher perceived service quality. (Kaplan et al. 
2014.) The real fairness of flat tariff is very much moral and ethical question that can be 
reviewed from many different perspectives. British philosopher and economist John Stuart 
Mill described the concept of utility as search after happiness (Mill, 2009, p.13). The idea 
of utilitarianism is that actions and institutions should increase the overall amount of hap-
piness in the world (Crisp, 1997, p.7). Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism and 
mentor of Mill, defined “the greatest happiness principle” morally obligatory, which pro-
duces the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people (Sweet, IEP). 
Utilitarianists would say that morality of action is based on its outcomes. Despite a criti-
cism towards utilitarianism, it still exits very much in the field of transportation, where 
economists calculate negative and positive externalities for cost-benefit analyses (CBA). In 
cost-benefit analysis values are used to produce the highest state of social wellbeing in 
terms of utility. Yet CBA ignores how preferences are chosen, and the legitimacy of the 
values to welfare maximization can be questioned. (Choy 2018.) 
 
The philosopher John Rawls published his famous book A Theory of Justice in 1971 and 
presented his two principles of justice. Firs one is The Greatest Equal Liberty Principle: 
“Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.” The second one is Difference 
principle and Equality of Opportunity principle: “Social and economic inequalities are to 
be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, 
and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.” (Rawls 2003, p.53.) The second prin-
ciple can be divided to two pairs. This principle only permits inequalities that work to the 
advantage of the worst-off. Rawls' view is that inequalities can be just, as long as they are 
to the benefit of the least well off. This is a question of the distribution of social and eco-
nomic primary goods among which Rawls includes the competences and privileges con-
nected with professional positions, income and possessions and the social bases of people’s 
sense of self-respect. These primary goods should usually be equally divided, unless une-
qual distribution is to everyone’s advantage. (Höffe 2013, p.40).  
 
Political theorist Michael Walzer (1983) considers society as distributive community 
where goods can neither be reduced to a set of abstract goods nor precisely valued as utili-
tarianists do. Goods can have different meanings in different societies and therefore com-
mon criteria cannot determine the distribution of all goods available in society. The social 
meaning of a good is crucial importance in Walzer’s approach. It is the basis for determin-
ing what constitutes a fair distribution. Walzer develops the concept of “distributive 
spheres” and goods that have a special social meaning, which differentiates them from reg-
ular goods. Regular goods like mobile phones can be distributed through the market and 
principle of free exchange. Goods with distinct social meaning should be taken out of the 
sphere of free exchange. Typical examples are health and education. According to Walzer, 
injustice occurs if spheres are not autonomous. The distribution of one good can become 
dominant and determine the distributions of many other spheres of distribution. Typically, 
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money and power are such dominant goods. Autonomy guarantees “complex equality”, 
where inequalities within spheres may exist, but will not add up across different spheres. 
(Martens 2012, p. 1035.) 
 
Karel Martens applies Walzer’s theory of justice to transport, and states that if transport 
good has a socially distinct meaning then a distributive approach to transport can be justi-
fied. He identifies accessibility as the good that best captures the social meaning of 
transport, and finds evidence that transport good should be set apart from other goods. 
Martens suggests transport planners should not focus to system functionality but person-
centered approach, where focus is in passengers’ accessibility levels, income levels, resi-
dential locations, travel-related abilities and available means of transportation. (Martens 
2017, pp. 215-217.) Martens’ conclusion is that injustice is done whenever a person experi-
ences an insufficient accessibility and interventions to transportation system are only justi-
fied if they do not result increase in the number of persons experiencing insufficient acces-
sibility. (Martens 2017, p. 126.) 
 
HiReach is an EU-project that aims to mitigate transport poverty. Kuttler et al. (2018) have 
defined transport poverty as follows: “An individual is transport poor if, in order to satisfy 
their daily basic activity needs, at least one of the following conditions apply (Figure 12): 
 
• There is no transport option available that is suited to the individual’s physical con-
dition and capabilities (availability), 
• The existing transport options do not reach destinations where the individual can 
fulfil his/her daily activity needs, in order to maintain a reasonable quality of life 
(accessibility), 
• The necessary weekly amount spent on transport leaves the household with a resid-
ual income below the official poverty line (affordability), 
• The individual needs to spend an excessive amount of time travelling, leading to 
time poverty or social isolation (time budget), 
• The prevailing travel conditions are dangerous, unsafe or unhealthy for the individ-
ual (adequacy). 
 
 
Figure 12. Five elements of transport poverty (Kuttler et al. 2018). 
 
Fairness of flat tariff can be question of perceived fairness or true affordability. People 
views about perceived fairness can be studied through different questionnaires, but if the 
principle that tariff change should not increase transport poverty of the least well off is ac-
cepted, transport planners need to understand, who are the least well off, where do they 
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live, what is the quality of their transport services and what are their daily basic transport 
needs.   
 
Distance based fares are usually considered to benefit those who travel short distances, 
whereas flat fare benefits those who travel long distance trips. In public debate, it is often 
said that flat fares are fairer for low income travellers and distance based fares benefits 
those who are more affluent. Rubensson, Cats and Susilo have researched whether the flat 
tariff of Stockholm is fair for residents, and their conclusion was contrary to arguments 
above: the more distance based the fare scheme is, the more it benefits low income travel-
lers. (Rubensson et al. 2018.) Anne Brown found similar results when she studied trips 
among different income groups in Los Angeles which has flat tariff scheme in public 
transport. In her studies (Figure 13), the tariff combining both a distance-based fare and an 
off-peak discount seems most preferable for low income group.  According to Brown, high 
and low-income riders take roughly the same number of trips, but low income riders travel 
more outside of the peak period. Low income riders have shorter distances per trip. Her 
analysis also revealed that low-income residents use less monthly passes. (Brown 2018.) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Judged by riders’ ability to pay, non-capped distance-based fares combined 
with time-of-day pricing result in the most equitable fare structure in Los Angeles (Brown 
2018). 
 
In Helsinki region, the total number of daily trips seem to increase along with the income 
level (Figure 14). Only the lowest income group has more total trips than in the previous 
income group. Yet, the number of car trips increases according to income level, and the 
31 
 
number of public transport trips decreases. It is fair judgement to say that the lowest in-
come group is most dependent of public transport, and potential tariff changes of PT have 
most significant effect on them.  
 
 
 
Figure 14. Trips in the Helsinki Region by personal income and mode of travel (HSL 2013, 
p. 43). 
 
2.4 Aggregated framework 
 
Theory section has presented relevant research related to tariff planning, pricing and 
transport justice, though vast amount of literature and research remains outside of this fol-
low-up. Design principles from different perspectives and disciplines are sometimes con-
flicting with each other, and tariff planners’ challenging task is to evaluate and prioritize 
different goals of PT tariff.  
 
Figure 15 presents the theoretical framework of this study for public transport tariff, which 
consists of three sub-frameworks: user frameworks, transport system framework and politi-
cal/social framework. Transport economics discipline would aim for maximising social 
welfare and find marginal social cost tariff as theoretical first best solution but hardly ap-
plicable. User framework would emphasize simplicity, attractiveness and perceived fair-
ness while marketer would pursuit maximisation of market share. Transport justice frame-
work would review tariff through social justice analysis. All three perspectives should be 
considered in transport organisation’s decision-making process.  
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Figure 15. Theoretical framework for planning a tariff structure. 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 The process of the research 
 
In the beginning of this study was a vague clue that despite the general reluctance towards 
flat tariff among the public transport professionals, flat tariff has attractive aspects from the 
user perspective. Intuition was that attractiveness of flat tariff is related to simplicity, eq-
uity questions and potential difficulties of the zonal system. The first pre-research question 
was “What would be a customer oriented and fair pricing model for public transport au-
thority of Helsinki region?” When the research plan was drafted, it soon became obvious 
that so wide question will not be solved in one master thesis. After data gathering, litera-
ture review and matching empirical data to theory, the final research questions and meth-
ods used to answer the questions were formulated as follows: 
 
 
1. What are motives and experiences for flat tariff in different cities? 
a. Experts interviews 
b. Document analysis 
2. How HSL-customers see flat tariff? What elements make it attractive/non-
attractive? 
a. Focus groups 
b. Individual interviews 
3. What effects flat tariff could have for ticket revenues, subsidies and usage 
of public transport in HSL region? 
a. Price elasticity calculations 
b. Theory and literature 
4. What effects flat tariff have for least well-off people in HSL region? 
a. Income analysis, trip analysis 
5. What frameworks public transport organisations should utilize when plan-
ning tariff and pricing strategies? 
a. Literature analysis and development of theoretical framework 
 
Experts from Turku, Stockholm, Wien and Paris with experience of flat tariff were inter-
viewed for the thesis. The interviews focused on finding out the motives and decision-mak-
ing process of the tariff system, the effects of flat tariff, customers’ reactions and the expe-
riences about the fairness of the system. Similar results were found between different cases 
but also differences and reasons for them. Cities were analysed based on features of flat 
tariff system, geographical area, effect on revenues and passenger growth and usability and 
fairness experience. 
 
Regular and random HSL users were interviewed in two separate focus group discussions 
to find out people’s attitudes and valuations about price, usability and perceived fairness of 
flat tariff. Discussions focused to compare the potential flat tariff with current zone based 
model, which was about to be launched few months after the interviews. Fourteen people 
were also interviewed individually concerning different tariff models for HSL and their 
comments about flat tariff were analysed for the thesis.  
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Price elasticities were used to calculate potential financial and demand effects of flat tariff. 
Trip and sales behaviour of whole region and low income postal code areas were analysed 
to understand current travel behaviour of the least well-off people and the potential effects 
flat tariff could have for their transport justice. The analysis was based on trip data from 
Telia mobile operator from the fall 2018 (Telia 2018), travel survey 2018 of HSL (HSL 
2019 a), sales data of HSL from May 2019 (HSL 2019 b) and postal code income data 
from the year 2016 (Statistics Finland 2019).  
 
The theoretical framework for the study has developed alongside the empirical studies us-
ing abductive methodology. This study can be categorized under behavioural economics, 
since emphasis is given to notions of people’s real behaviour and emotions. The concept of 
loss aversion of prospect theory was found to be useful to explain critical challenges of flat 
tariff. However, theoretical framework was originally based on traditional transport eco-
nomics and discipline of marketing. The question of transport justice was presented from 
the very beginning but not clearly defined. It was recognized that equity was one of the 
critical arguments used both to support and resist flat tariff. When the study evolved and 
first expert interviews and focus group discussion were held, the fields of transport eco-
nomics and marketing just did not seem to fit together. The economist’s idea of an optimal 
price for the ticket which can be calculated in theory from private and social internal and 
external costs just did not fit the marketer’s idea of price being whatever the consumer is 
willing to pay. This puzzle was source of frustration and anxiety. Just after all the inter-
views were made, the article “Economics and marketing on pricing: how and why do they 
differ?” (Skouras et al. 2005) was found. This article shared innovation of the differences 
between two disciplines, and built a bridge between mathematic-logically oriented eco-
nomics and behaviourally oriented marketing. The article referred severally to behavioural 
economics and brought this discipline into theoretical framework. The study evolved with 
following phases presented in Figure 16. 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Timeline of the studying process. 
 
In the end, this research is more interested in how actually people behave and not so much 
how they are assumed to behave according to utilitarian principle. Yet, dependence on be-
havioural economics was not known, when empirical data was collected. After critical re-
flection, the methodology, questionnaires for the focus groups and expert interviews could 
have been more focused to behavioural questions. 
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3.2 Abductive reasoning 
 
The methodology of this study is based on abductive approach of case studies. The main 
characteristic of this approach is a continuous movement between an empirical world and a 
theoretical model. During the process the research questions and the analytical framework 
are reoriented when they are confronted with the empirical world. Systematic combining is 
a process where theoretical framework, empirical fieldwork and case analysis evolve sim-
ultaneously. (Dubois & Gadde 2002, p.554.)  
 
Abductive logic was developed after its predecessors deductive and inductive logic, which 
are the two most commonly known methods in qualitative research. Deductive logic means 
philosophical reasoning from a known, general level to specific facts, from theory to con-
crete details. The research is directed by previous research, earlier theories, and intuitive 
logical thinking of the researcher. A theoretical model achieved by this process directs the 
data collection and analysis on an empirical level. Deductive research favours surveys, 
where questionnaires are formulated according to researcher’s theoretical framework. 
(Grönfors 2008, p.14.)  
 
In contrast, inductive analysis is logical reasoning from details to generalizations, building 
a theory based on empirical data. Induction is usually related to purely qualitative, unstruc-
tured research methods. (Grönfors 2008, p. 15.) A critical phase for the inductive re-
searcher is the classification of the data to create different categories and find correlations 
and relations between different sectors of empirical data. The concept of pure inductive re-
search has been criticized since in most cases the researcher has some idea or clue upon 
which he goes to collect the empirical data. Such clue-driven research is known as abduc-
tive reasoning.  
 
Abductive reasoning states that new scientific discoveries are possible only when findings 
are generated based on some principle, not only based on observations. The clue can be 
vague and intuitive, but it allows the researcher to focus his attention on something he be-
lieves might bring new knowledge of the phenomenon. The researcher can get his clue ei-
ther from empirical interviews or from previous research or theories. The clue can be aban-
doned or modified through the whole research process. (Grönfors 2008, pp. 17-18.)  
 
3.3 Systematic combining 
 
Research methodology tends to describe case studies as a linear process in the literature. 
Abductive systematic combining requires an integrated approach, and the main difficulty is 
handling the interrelation of the various elements during the research work. Researcher is 
constantly going back and forth from one type of research activity to another, between em-
pirical observations and theory, which enables expansion of understanding of both theory 
and empirical phenomena. The researcher has preliminary framework consisting of precon-
ceptions. Over time it is developed according to what is discovered through the empirical 
fieldwork as well as through analysis and interpretation. Empirical unanticipated observa-
tions might be further explored in interviews or by other means, and might end up redirect-
ing the theoretical framework or change of the theoretical model. This process is named as 
systematic combining (Figure 17). (Dubois & Gadde 2002, p. 555) 
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Figure 17. Systematic combining (Dubois & Gadde 2002, p. 555). 
 
In systematic combining confrontation of theory to empirical data is continuous throughout 
the research process. This process is directed by another confrontation between the evolv-
ing framework and the evolving case. Matching is going back and forth between frame-
work, data sources and analysis. Based on inductive methods, data should not be forced to 
fit pre-existing categories rather than the categories are to be developed from data. Yet, de-
velopment of the theoretical framework is critical since systematic combining is studying 
theoretical concepts as well. (Dubois & Gadde 2002, p.556). 
 
One way to increase the reliability of the research is to use different types of data, theories, 
perspectives or analytical methods. This is called triangulation, and it aims to show that the 
result is not obtained randomly but that different approaches can be used to achieve the 
same result. Qualitative research emphasizes subjective interpretation and therefore trian-
gulation is not as relevant as in some other methods. In systematic combining the emphasis 
on verification is not the main issue. Rather, multiple sources contribute to revealing as-
pects unknown to the researcher and lead to discover new dimensions of the research prob-
lem and redirection of the study. (Dubois & Gadde 2002, p.556.) 
 
Some researchers think, that multiple cases give some notion of statistical significance. 
This should not be the method in qualitative research. “Researching greater number of 
cases, with the same resources, means more breadth, but less depth” (Easton 1995, p. 382). 
Yet there has been criticism towards case study as scientific method. Easton (1995, p. 379) 
identifies three types of weaknesses in case study research: some case studies are simply 
rich descriptions of events and reader is expected to come to their own conclusions. “Many 
pseudo observers seem bent on describing everything and as a result describe nothing” 
(Weick, 1979, p. 38). Another problem is limited data that appear to provide only partial 
support of theories or frameworks and are used as quasi-deductive theory testing. A third 
weakness is usage of multiple case studies in a way that suggests they are offering some 
statistical generalisation. Dubois and Gadde suggest that stronger reliance on theory would 
help to reduce the negative effects of the second weakness identified by Easton. They sug-
gest that investing in theory might improve the explanatory power of case studies.  
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If the research problem is focused on comparison of a few specific variables, good choice 
is to increase the number of observations. If the problem is analysis of interdependent vari-
ables in complex structures, the natural choice would be to go deeper into one case instead 
of increasing the number of cases. (Dubois and Gadde 2002, pp. 558-559.) This study is an 
example of the latter case. Dubois and Gadde question the idea that adding same type cases 
would automatically offer more analytical power. There actually seems to be consensus 
among researches that case studies rely on analytical, not statistical generalization. (Dubois 
and Gadde 2014, p. 1279). Gummesson agrees that research based on few cases cannot an-
swer questions related to “how often” and “how much” but “is it not better to understand a 
phenomenon in depth than to know how often the not understood phenomenon occurs?” 
(Gummesson 2007, p. 230). 
 
For positivistic approach the aim of research is to test and verify findings based on criteria 
developed for quantitative research: validity and reliability. For them case research might 
be considered aa a second-best method or a pre-study approach to generate theoretical set-
ting before conducting proper studies. Positivist approach strives for simplicity and gener-
ality while non-positivists tend to favour complexity, originality and specificity. The objec-
tives of researchers determine the choice. (van Maanen et al. 2007, p.1148.) 
 
In systematic combining the problems should not occur if the evolving case and evolving 
framework follow the procedure of matching. Theory is the main tool for keeping control 
of data collection. The other rule is to have a parsimonious approach in the writing the 
case. (Dubois & Gadde 2002, p. 560). Common weakness of case-based research is lack of 
selectivity. Researcher can easily feel that everything is so interesting and should be shared 
with the reader, though readers tend to be more interested in the conceptual arguments than 
in the data. (Siggelkow 2007, p. 23.)  
 
Research involving single case can get much closer to theoretical constructs and provide 
more persuasive argument about causal forces than broad empirical research can. How-
ever, researcher can’t say the reader should believe that A leads to B, because there is an 
example. Theory should stand on its own feet and researcher needs to convince the reader 
that the conceptual argument is plausible and use the case as additional justification for the 
argument. (Siggelkow 2007, pp. 22-23.)  
 
Abductive researcher should have some background theoretical information, but there is no 
need to review all literature beforehand. The researcher is not even able to identify all the 
literature since the empirical fieldwork challenges the theoretical conceptualization. Hence, 
the need for theory is created during the process. One major difference compared to both 
deductive and inductive studies, is the role of the framework. In abductive studies the orig-
inal framework is modified based on unanticipated empirical findings (inductive method) 
but also based on theoretical insights gained during the process (deductive method). The 
analytical framework can be tight and pre-structured or loose and emergent. Dubois and 
Gadde suggest a tight and evolving framework in systematic combining. (Dubois and 
Gadde 2002, pp. 558-560.) 
 
The process of abduction exists most likely in all promising research projects but is largely 
hidden from view because academic journals require a rather strict separation between the 
presentation of results and conclusions and between the presentation of theory and method. 
In reality, the research process is often messy and difficult to articulate. (van Maanen, 
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Sörensson & Mitchell 2007, p. 1149.) What is learned during the research process is gener-
ally considered the most important outcome of the research process. (Dubois and Gadde 
2002, p. 560.) Here are listed main lessons of abductive systematic combining for qualita-
tive case studies.  
 
1. Researcher needs clue or preliminary framework. 
2. Evolving framework. 
3. Tight but evolving theory.  
4. Use inductive methods for empirical data. Be selective and parsimonious. Fo-
cus rather to conceptual arguments than in data.  
5. Use different types of data, theories, perspectives or analytical methods. Multi-
ple sources reveal aspects unknown to the researcher. Discover new dimen-
sions of the research problem and be ready to redirect the study. 
6. Matching is going back and forth between framework, data sources and analy-
sis. 
7. Case is a deep analysis of interdependent variables in complex structures. The 
evolving case is a tool which sharpens during the study.  
8. Favour complexity, originality and specificity. Use analytical, not statistical 
generalizations. 
9. Describe process of abduction and learning. 
3.4 Interviews 
 
Four other cases of flat tariff from European cities were studied to find out their motives 
and experiences of flat tariff. Chosen cities were Turku, Stockholm, Wien and Paris. They 
all have flat tariff in use, some for very long time and some have just recently moved from 
zones into flat tariff. Public transport culture, usage and subsidy levels of these cities are 
similar with HSL, so these cases can give some insights of potential effects of flat tariff.  
Cases were studied using qualitative method of content analysis of expert interviews and 
document analysis. Especially following themes were studied: features of flat tariff system, 
geographical area, populations, number of municipalities, changes in revenues and passen-
ger numbers, usability and fairness experiences, equity issues, land use and actual process. 
Following people were interviewed using specific questionnaire (Appendix 1). 
 
Top manager, Föli, Turku 
Sales manager, Stockholm County Council, Transport Administration 
Tariff manager, Wienerlinien 
Tariff expert, Wienerlinien 
Financial manager, Verkehrsverbund Ost-Region  
Top manager, Ile-de-France Mobilités  
 
All other interviews were made face-to-face, recorded and transcribed but interview with 
tariff manager from Wienerlinien was made by phone and interviews with tariff expert and 
financial manager from the Vienna region were made by email. The documents and reports 
of the travel data from the regions were analysed as well (Appendix 2). 
 
The potential case of flat tariff for HSL region was studied through qualitative methods of 
focus groups and individual interviews. Two qualitative focus group discussions (regular + 
random users) were held, recorded, transcribed and analysed using content analysis and 
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evolving framework. Participants for focus groups were recruited from Norstat panel (Ta-
ble 3 and 4). Participants were rewarded with 50 euros gift card. Both groups had two par-
ticipants from the A-zone, three from B-zone, two from C-zone and one from D-zone. 
Their share reflected the real proportion of population between zones. One member of the 
second group cancelled very late, and the replacement came so late that no other data was 
collected just that he was from Kirkkonummi.  
 
Table 2. The participants of the regular users focus group. 
 
ID City Age Profession Status Education Family Zone 
1 Helsinki 44 Secretary Working full 
time 
University Single A 
2 Vantaa 62 Practical nurse Working full 
time 
High school Two adults C VANTAA 
3 Helsinki 22 Unemployed Unemployed High school Single A 
4 Espoo 38 Food worker Working full 
time 
High school Two adults B ESPOO 
5 Espoo 26 Student Student High school Two adults B ESPOO 
6 Kirkko-
nummi 
28 Student Student Applied sci-
ences 
Two adults D 
7 Helsinki 39 Controller Parental leave University Two adults, 
children 
B HELSINKI 
8 Espoo 55 Real estate 
agent 
Working full 
time 
University Single C ESPOO  
 
Table 3. The participants of the random users focus group. 
 
ID Age City Profession Status Education Family Zone 
1 50 Helsinki Wages clerk Student High school Single A 
2 58 Vantaa Maintenance 
manager 
Working full 
time 
Applies sci-
ences 
Two adults, chil-
dren 
C VANTAA 
3 32 Espoo Teacher Parental leave University Two adults C ESPOO 
4 24 Helsinki Student Student Applied sci-
ences 
Single A 
5 61 Espoo Pensioner Retired University Single B ESPOO 
6 62 Espoo Engineer Working part 
time 
Applied sci-
ences 
Two adults B ESPOO 
7 62 Helsinki Pensioner Retired University Two adults B HELSINKI 
8 - Kirkko-
nummi 
- - - - D 
 
Focus group discussions were based on semi-structured interview model (Appendix 3). 
The original clue for focus groups was that three dimensions of price, usability and fairness 
are important and interconnected, when people evaluate the attractiveness of any tariff set-
ting. After the first content analysis, the framework expanded with several other categories 
such as budget, land use and modal share, which is often the problem with qualitative anal-
ysis (Krueger and Casey 2015, p. 290). Qualitative theoretical literature guided the study to 
return the original, parsimonious framework (Figure 18). 
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Figure 18.  Framework for focus group discussions. 
 
Fourteen individual customers were interviewed and recorded about tariff preferences (Ta-
ble 5). These participants were also recruited form Norstat panel with similar tactics as 
with focus groups. The number 7 cancelled the interview, which explains why ID run to 15 
even though only 14 interviews were made. 
 
Table 4. Individual interviews about different tariff models in HSL region. 
 
ID Gen-
der 
Usage Age Profession Status Educa-
tion 
Family City Zone 
1 F Regular, uses 
wheel chair 
19 Unem-
ployed 
Unemployed Primary 
school 
Single Helsinki B 
2 F Random 67 Pensioner Retired Applied 
sci-
ences 
Single Helsinki B 
3 M Don't use PT 36 Business 
manager 
Working full 
time 
Univer-
sity 
Two adults, 
children 
Espoo C 
4 M Regular 41 Chef Working full 
time 
Voca-
tional 
school 
Two adults, 
children 
Vantaa Not 
known 
5 M Don't use PT 23 student Part time 
working 
High 
school 
Single Helsinki A 
6 F Random 23 Waitress Student Voca-
tional 
school 
Single Helsinki A 
7  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - 
8 M Regular 36 Physio-
therapist 
Working full 
time 
Applied 
sci-
ences 
Two adults, 
children 
Helsinki A 
9 F Regular 47 Assistant Working full 
time 
Voca-
tional 
school 
Two adults, 
children 
Vantaa B 
10 F Don't use PT 43 System en-
gineer 
Working full 
time 
Voca-
tional 
school 
Single Espoo B 
11 M Don't use PT 55 Wine spe-
cialist 
Working full 
time 
Voca-
tional 
school 
Single Porvoo - 
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12 F Don't use PT 31 Unem-
ployed 
Unemployed Applied 
sci-
ences 
Two adults, 
children 
Espoo B 
13 F Regular 24 Waitress Part time 
working 
Voca-
tional 
school 
One adult, 
children 
Espoo B 
14 M Random 47 Areal man-
ager 
Working full 
time 
Voca-
tional 
school 
Two adults Vantaa B 
15 F Regular 64 Pensioner Retired High 
school 
Single Kerava D 
 
 
Individual interviews were also targeted towards regular and random users, but also to no 
users because HSL wanted to understand how to promote these people a change in their 
transport behaviour. Selection criteria for these interviews followed the same principle as 
with focus groups.  The duration of interviews was about 1,5 hours. Individual interviews 
were conducted by three people from service design agency Hellon: Ari, Maija and Sari. 
Interviews were recorded and first interpreted by interviewers. Second time analysis of flat 
tariff responses was made to this research by author. The interviews were based on a semi-
structured thematic interview model (Appendix 4) and supported by scenario and theme 
cards. The interviews were analysed using inductive grounded theory, where first round of 
data analysis identifies emerging themes and then data was grouped around categories. The 
object of the interviews was to collect data about users’ preferences and motives for choose 
or reject of tariff model. Three of the models focused on travel area: distance based, flat or 
personal zone tariff. Wider report of the results was used for HSL tariff development pur-
poses, but this study was mainly interested in people’s perceptions about flat tariff, which 
was the last model presented to the people. Flat tariff questions below were planned with 
the team of HSL and presented to people in interviews aiming to find motives and the ra-
tionalisation people used when they described their preferences towards flat tariff. 
 
What do you think if you could travel the whole HSL area with one price? Why? 
What is good about this pricing? Why? 
What is bad about this pricing? Why? 
Is flat pricing easy to understand? Why/Why not? 
Would flat tariff have effect on your travelling? How? 
How fair/unfair the model is for you?  
How fair/unfair the model is for all people living in metropolitan area? 
 
Framework for individual interviews in this study consisted of three different travel area 
tariff models and customer’s own preference. 
 
Figure 19. Framework for analysis of individual interviews. 
 
42 
 
Both focus groups and individual interviews were analysed by using content analysis 
method, where many words of the text are classified into fewer content categories and are 
presumed to have similar meanings. Similarity may be based on the precise meaning of the 
words or based on words sharing similar connotations to different concepts. A variable is 
valid to the extent that it measures or represents what the investigator intends it to measure. 
(Weber 1990, p.12.) In this study the qualitative analysis followed the principle descried by 
Mayring: “Qualitative content analysis is not a rigidly delineated technique, but a process 
in which new decisions regarding basic procedure and individual stages of analysis con-
stantly have to be made. In qualitatively oriented research theoretical arguments must be 
used and technical fuzziness is compensated for by theoretical stringency…In qualitative 
content analysis, content-related arguments should always be given preference over proce-
dural arguments; validity is regarded more highly than reliability.” (Mayring, 2014, p.41.) 
 
3.5 Elasticity calculations 
 
Financial and transport system effects of flat tariff on HSL revenue and transport demand 
were evaluated using price elasticity values from the HSL survey (HSL 2014). Change of 
demand and sales were calculated using short-run values and long-run values (Table 5 and 
Table 6). Short-run effects refers to the change of demand in one year. Short-run calcula-
tions were made both with total sales data estimation for 2018 and restricted sales data 
from May 2019 after the zonal change. Long-run calculations were made only with May 
data. Sales data from May 2019 included HSL residents 18+ sales of monthly and single 
tickets from travel card and mobile ticketing system with postal code data. Following equa-
tion was used to calculate demand changes.  
 
Equation 1. (1-price elasticity coefficient PEC x price change%) x old sales pcs = new 
sales pcs 
 
Table 5. Price elasticity values in HSL region. (HSL, 2014, p. 17). 
 
Price elasticity values  Short-run Long-run 
Single tickets -0,5 -1,4 
Value tickets (travel card, mobile) -0,32 -0,6 
Seasonal tickets -0,36 -0,78 
 
 
Table 6. Example of formula of calculations for sales and demand changes. 
 
*Price elasticity coefficient, always calculated with positive number 
  
 
The effects of flat tariff were calculated two times: first on estimated sales of 2018, and the 
second calculation was made based on the sales data of May 2019, when new zone tariff 
was already in use. 2018 sales including single tickets, value tickets and seasonal tickets 
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for adults, children and discount groups of the whole year accounted for 373 million euros. 
Numbers include no daily tickets. Both tram tickets and value tickets are included under 
the category “single tickets”. Sales data from May included customer data, which enabled 
clearing children tickets and sales from postal codes outside HSL region. Analysed sales 
included only over 18+ customers living inside HSL region, so that the data would be as 
comparable as possible with the income data as well with HSL trip data, which were also 
restricted to trips inside HSL region and by adult residents. 
 
3.6 Income analysis 
 
Income and trip analysis were used to study the social justice of flat tariff. Wellbeing dis-
tributes unevenly in HSL region and there are income differences between different postal 
codes areas. Income data of postal codes was retrieved from Statistics Finland (Statistics 
Finland 2019). Data consist of data of disposable monetary income by postal code. Table 7 
lists 30 lowest income postal code areas in HSL region by average income per capita. Four 
postal codes from each zone were chosen for the analysis. 
 
Table 7. Inhabitants’ monetary income 2016. Source: Statistics Finland. 
  
Age 18 
or over 
Aver-
age in-
come 
Median 
income 
Inhabitants 
belonging to 
the lowest 
income dec-
ile 
Inhabitants 
belonging to 
the highest 
income dec-
ile  
02150 Otaniemi   (Espoo ) 3848 12124 10469 2407 193 
00940 Kontula - Vesala   (Helsinki ) 20873 20403 19324 4904 2701 
01530 Veromiehenkylä   (Vantaa ) 405 20417 20923 95 50 
00770 Jakomäki - Alppikylä   (Helsinki ) 5372 20528 19672 1102 656 
02410 Gesterby   (Kirkkonummi ) 1746 21027 19624 335 257 
00410 Malminkartano   (Helsinki ) 7113 21033 20296 1772 1171 
01360 Koivukylä-Havukoski   (Vantaa ) 10348 21398 20166 2162 1540 
00900 Puotinharju   (Helsinki ) 3566 21462 19900 788 600 
00420 Kannelmäki   (Helsinki ) 11888 21737 20232 2597 2011 
00820 Roihuvuori   (Helsinki ) 6014 21884 20512 1194 1037 
00600 Koskela-Helsinki   (Helsinki ) 3481 21901 18418 863 586 
00550 Vallila   (Helsinki ) 8672 21904 20155 1962 1523 
00970 Mellunmäki   (Helsinki ) 8769 21999 20954 1712 1407 
01200 Hakunila   (Vantaa ) 9264 22112 21052 1742 1463 
00710 Pihlajamäki   (Helsinki ) 10350 22323 21284 1923 1807 
00910 Puotila   (Helsinki ) 5162 22420 20959 937 900 
00400 Pohjois-Haaga   (Helsinki ) 8319 22421 21185 1693 1707 
01340 Leinelä   (Vantaa ) 684 22482 21856 91 104 
01370 Jokiniemi   (Vantaa ) 5276 22484 21778 1042 937 
00980 Etelä-Vuosaari   (Helsinki ) 17654 22537 20968 3716 3316 
00700 Malmi   (Helsinki ) 10925 22695 21092 2034 1893 
01720 Petikko   (Vantaa ) 56 22728 23838 9 16 
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00720 Pukinmäki-Savela   (Helsinki ) 7110 22734 21474 1366 1307 
00500 Sörnäinen   (Helsinki ) 12062 22874 21226 2327 2397 
01600 Myyrmäki   (Vantaa ) 13865 22895 21809 2304 2561 
02470 Upinniemi   (Kirkkonummi ) 283 22929 22928 34 39 
04250 Alikerava   (Kerava ) 3835 23133 22287 605 709 
00520 Itä-Pasila   (Helsinki ) 6304 23484 21583 1349 1445 
00920 Myllypuro   (Helsinki ) 10020 23493 21809 1876 2087 
01280 Länsimäki   (Vantaa ) 7695 23498 22558 1324 1552 
 
The university campus Otaniemi emerged as the poorest neighbourhood. However, the res-
idents in Otaniemi are mainly students, and therefore it was excluded from the review. 
Some postal codes include both low and high-income subareas, which can distort the aver-
age. Income data of 250 m x 250 m squares from Statistics Finland was located to map us-
ing Qgis-software (Figure 20). The income distribution map shows low income neighbour-
hoods location along the rail and metro corridor to east and north from Helsinki city centre. 
Many red coloured high income squares concentrate to western direction of Espoo and 
Kauniainen and on the coast line. Low income postal codes can be found also from Espoon 
keskus and Kirkkonummi. A-zone has some low income postal code areas, but some 
doubts can be presented whether these areas represent truly underprivileged area or if they 
are inhabited by young people. Low income regions on B-zone situate usually with a very 
good PT service level and moderate price level. Based on geographical income analysis 
four postal codes from each zone were chosen for trip analysis (Figure 21). 
 
00550 Vallila (Helsinki ), A-zone 
00940 Kontula - Vesala (Helsinki ), B-zone 
01360 Koivukylä-Havukoski (Vantaa ), C-zone 
02410 Gesterby (Kirkkonummi ), D-zone 
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Figure 20. Two lowest (blue) and one highest (red) income decile squares of 250 m x 250 
m in HSL region. 
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Figure 21.  Postal code areas 00550, 00940, 01360 and 02410 circled on income distribu-
tion map. 
 
Following indicators were calculated for the whole region and for chosen postal codes: PT 
spending per capita, PT spending-% of average income and share of AB, ABC and ABCD 
sales of total PT sales. Calculations were made using the population data and income data 
from Statistics Finland and PT sales data of May 2019 from HSL.  
3.7 Trip analysis 
 
Travelling behaviour of the whole HSL region and the chosen postal code areas were ana-
lysed to understand the transport justice differences of low income regions and potential 
effects of flat tariff. Also, the general distribution of trips and PT trips is interesting infor-
mation, since flat tariff is worthy option if the deviation of trip lengths is small.  
 
Trip data was retrieved from HSL travel survey 2018 (HSL 2019 a), mobile operator Te-
lia’s GPS database (Telia 2018), and sales data from HSL’ travel card and mobile ticket 
system (HSL 2019 b). HSL trip data was based on travel journal study, which studies how 
and where people in the Helsinki region travel in everyday life. Data was collected by 
online survey and telephone interviews in autumn 2018 at weeks 36–40 and 44–48. Over 
38 720 randomly selected 7-year-olds were invited to the survey, of which 10 924 partici-
pated. In this thesis data was cleared from children trips, trips to or from outside of HSL 
region and trips made by people living outside the region. Left were only trips made inside 
HSL region by adult living in HSL region. Trip data for this study consist of 5690 people 
and 21168 trips.  
 
Telia-data was collected during the same weeks as HSL travel survey. Data was averaged 
for each weekday and then multiplied accordingly to represent one week’s trips. Almost 25 
million trips were made in week, where both origin and destination were inside HSL-re-
gion. Data shows the number of trips between origin and destination postal codes, but does 
not include information about the transport mode. Data was cleared from trips to or from 
outside the HSL region. Most of the postal codes belong only to one zone but 23 postal 
codes cover two zones. Those trips were divided to zones using the zonal share of starting 
47 
 
trips from HSL survey. Based on GPS data, in whole HSL region 76 % of all trips are 
made inside one zone and 19 % inside two zones (Figure 22). So, 95 % of all trips are 
made inside a flat tariff, since two zones is the minimum price.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Trips between the zones in HSL region in the fall 2018 and the distribution of 
one zone trips (Telia 2018). 
 
These findings are supported by HSL travel survey (Figure 23). Yet, HSL survey includes 
passenger information and was restricted only to 18 years or over residents’ trips, which 
can explain slightly higher degree of three-zone and four-zone trips in this data. The aver-
age length of all trips in HSL survey from the crow flies accounts for 5,5 kilometres.  
Overall picture of these two data sources is similar: one zone trips constitute a major part 
of all trips. 
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Figure 23. Trips of 18+ inhabitants in HSL region (HSL 2019 a). 
 
However, general trip distribution relates no directly to public transport trips, since walk-
ing and cycling trips are usually shorter than public transport trips. Of all analysed re-
spondents in HSL survey, 34 % had made PT trips. The share of PT trips of all trips was 20 
%. The average length of PT trips was 9,1 kilometres, therefore significantly longer than 
the average general trip length. Of all PT trips, 81 % were made inside one or two zones, 
and the rest of the trips were divided evenly between three-zone and four-zone trips (Fig-
ure 24). Similar analyses were made to four chosen postal code, and the results are re-
ported in the next chapter. 
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Figure 24. PT trips and sales of 18+ inhabitants in HSL region (HSL 2019 a, HSL 2019 b). 
 
3.8 Systematic combining in HSL case 
 
The process of systematic combining of this case study is described in Figure 25.  
 
 
 
Figure 25. Systematic combining of the case study of flat tariff in HSL region. 
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4. Results 
 
4.1 City cases 
 
Following four European city regions have used flat tariff as a pricing model for public 
transport either for the whole region or some part of the network. Pricing solutions are 
based on different historical developments in each city. 
 
Turku 
 
As EU public transport procurement governed by the Public Service Obligation (PSO) en-
tered into force in 2009, the new law mandated regional authorities over urban public 
transport services. The legal change was the biggest in decades. Starting from 2012, Turku 
has been the authority for public transport of the area covering six municipalities: Kaarina, 
Lieto, Naantali, Raisio, Rusko and Turku (Figure 26). All the regional transit contracts ex-
pired on 30.6.2014, when the regional authority Föli was established, and new regional tar-
iff needed to decide. The current Föli area covers 1185 km² and habits 293 000 people. 
 
 
Figure 26. Flat tariff area of Föli in 2019. Source: https://opaskartta.turku.fi. 
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Turku region started to plan payment system for regional transport service already in 2012. 
City procured a study about the payment, ticketing and zone options for the region, which 
looked at four different tariff models:  flat rate for the entire region, municipal model, 2-
zone model and 4-zone model. The conclusion of the comparison showed that 4-zone 
model with minimum 2-zone ticket purchase would generate the biggest revenues and PT 
trips but at the same time would be the most complicated (Table 9).  
 
Table 8. The estimated effects of different tariff models in Turku region (Kalenoja, 
Metsäpuro, Wallander 2012, p. 27). 
 
 
 
Föli decided flat tariff instead of zones. Member of top management in Turku public 
transport operations opened the process behind the decision. Pressure towards flat tariff 
came especially inside Turku, but also due to practical problems of new payment system. 
“Two zone model was presented to the municipalities, but they felt someone was left to the 
other side of the border and others pay more than others. Aggressive resistance came from 
all those who would have been left in the second zone especially within Turku. It raised 
war. No politicians were willing to make such decisions. Turku politicians began to think, 
if Turku should be on the first zone and the others second, but it was not in accordance 
with the agreement that municipal boundaries will be removed. Then won the idea that we 
could start with flat tariff and rethink later. The key coincidence was that we were in the 
Market Court for the payment system purchase, and it was easier for us to make the system 
work without zones, since there was very little time left. Flat tariff was result of both pur-
poseful planning and coincidence”, manager opens the process.  
 
Flat tariff simplicity helped to begin the regional operations. “It was a fascinating that 
when we decided to go on flat tariff, everyone was happy and things started to go like 
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dancing. Many other things were twisted but this suddenly was terribly easy to decide”, 
manager explains. The price of the Turku season ticket did not change in the reform, but 
some felt the regional tariff was an increase because there were new people who could 
travel at the same price. “It's peculiar that even if your own price stays unchanged, you feel 
it is out of your pocket if someone else gets the same benefit. It is the length of the journey 
that can produce a sense of injustice. If you have a three kilometres trip and the other one 
drives 20 kilometres, you start to think your price should have become cheaper. But it is a 
minority that has experienced that. Most people in Turku have seen this as positive thing.” 
Manager views that the fairness of flat tariff realizes on service levels instead of prices. 
“There are areas where the bus goes in every ten minutes, but if you are in Rymättylä and 
have a cheap ticket, you have to plan your trip, since bus goes once an hour or even less 
frequently.” 
 
Manager considers simplicity as a best thing in flat tariff. “It's easy for customers. The sec-
ond thing is that it is easier to develop the system without the zones. Weaknesses are hard 
to come by, perhaps the only thing is that people living in the centre of Turku may have the 
feeling that the model favours those who live further.” 
 
The regional trips increased over 15 % after the change. There has also been growth in 
Turku. Transport consultant Ramboll made passenger surveys both in 2014 (710 respond-
ents) and 2015 (865 respondents). The later survey showed that flat tariff was considered 
as the most significant reason for increase of PT usage. The pre-estimated negative effects 
of injustice and scattered land use have not realized (Table 9). 
 
Table 9. Traveller’s estimations of the factors behind increased PT usage in Föli region 
2014 – 2015 (Ramboll, 2015). 
 
 
 
Manager sees flat tariff as one cornerstone of Föli’s success. People like flat tariff and it 
has received the most positive feedback over the years because of its easiness. “Simplicity 
is a great thing. If you want the ease of everyday life, flat rate is one piece in it.” 
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Turku PT region is expanding and the tariff questions are considered again. Municipalities 
Paimio, Parainen, Masku, Nousiainen Mynämäki would like to join Föli and the flat rate. 
Föli would like to stick to tariff model too but with newcomers the whole region expands 
much. Manager does not believe new potential municipalities could join flat tariff. 
Transport consultant Trafix made a study in 2017 about three potential tariff models for the 
wider area of Föli: flat tariff, 3-zone model and 4-zone model. Both zone models were esti-
mated to generate more revenues than flat tariff but decrease the number of trips. The re-
port ended up recommending Föli to stick with flat tariff for the current region since the 
benefits from the increased revenues are not that significant that they would cover the risks 
of introducing zone tariff with weaker clarity and comprehensibility. 
 
Stockholm 
 
Stockholm region gave up zones in the beginning of 2017. The current one zone area co-
vers the Stockholm county which includes 26 counties, over 2,3 million people and geo-
graphical area over 6300 square kilometres.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Zone model of SL before the change. Source: Beslutsunderlag gällande SL:s 
zonsystem. 
 
The public transport administration at Region Stockholm plans the public transport in 
Stockholm County. The brand name for public transport is SL, Storstockholms Lokaltrafik. 
The service is very metropolitan like in the central Stockholm but rural in the outer re-
gions. Transport system covers buses, subways, trams, commuter trains and some boats. 
SL has had flat zone for monthly passes all the way from The Million Program, which was 
launched in 1960’s (Allmännyttan 2019), a social democrat housing construction program 
which aimed to solve an acute housing shortage. However, single journey tickets were 
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based on zones. The tariff manager of SL remembers Stockholm county had five-zone-sys-
tem for single tickets for decades. There was a short, nine months period in 2006 without 
single ticket zones, when politicians decided quickly about one zone system. Trial ended in 
April 2017, and SL moved back to zones but this time to three zones. “The very cheap sin-
gle ticket of that time made people buy single tickets instead of seasonal tickets. Price ratio 
between them was so good. Politicians noticed this was not good for financials, and tariff 
was running only for nine months”, SL manager describes. 
 
The system worked nicely from the simplicity perspective when people used paper strips 
and they could ask the driver, which ticket is needed between two places as the driver 
stamped the ticket. When SL changed paper strip to electronic strip, people were forced to 
use higher level of self service and had to decide which zones to buy. “We don’t under-
stand this, I feel unsecure, have I paid right amount, have I paid too little or too much”, 
manager describes customers’ challenges. Majority of the politicians wanted SL to make 
their Access card system simpler for the travellers. SL was looking at different things from 
changing signs to other options. SL established a political steering committee for the work, 
which had one politician from each party of the board. Process was laborious but fruitful. 
“Flat fare had opponents and supporters based on political colour. Politicians were in-
volved and they had possibility to go back to their working groups in their parties and 
check what they think. I think everyone came along during these meetings and said flat 
fare could be a good idea”, manager analyses. 
 
SL investigated several ways to make tariff simpler for the customers. They surveyed per-
sonal zone model of Skånetrafiken and what other authorities were doing outside Sweden. 
They calculated whether they should have zones for monthly passes. The decrease in price 
of having just one zone monthly ticket was minimal but the price doubled for those travel-
ling three zones. Nobody wanted that. Quite soon parties realized that the easiest thing to 
simplify the system would be one zone tariff. They agreed it should be done without de-
creasing the revenues and it should bring more customers to public transport.  
SL arranged customer interviews, customer meetings, customer surveys and service de-
signs process. Question of price always came up. Customers were saying: “This is really 
good thing but if it is going to be really expensive, then I don’t think it is good thing.” Fi-
nally, SL was quite confident about the change. They calculated that 80 % of their total 
sales were season tickets. From single journey tickets 80 % were travelling only in one 
zone. Based on these findings SL calculated that if they had flat tariff, the need for extra 
charge would be only 1,5 crowns for journey. One zone price at that time was 25 crowns. 
The board of Trafiknämden made the decision based on figures.  
SL assumed that flat tariff would ease and promote the usage of public transport for those 
people living in the outer region or suburbs. But people making short trips seemed to like 
flat tariff too. “People travelling only one zone also liked it because they don’t have to 
think about zones anymore”, manager tells. He believes that people living in certain sub-
urbs are more likely segregated and flat tariff offers them possibilities to travel through the 
region. “Our customers and politicians liked the thought about the fairness. It was equal to 
everyone and people liked about it, could connect to it and felt that this is fair.”  
Some customers were irritated, why they need to pay the same if they are travelling only 
few stops. SL was replying, that in the central Stockholm SL is offering a great service 
with subway going in every 90 seconds and number of buses, trains, trams and places 
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where person can buy a ticket. Out in the region there might be two buses in a day. Ac-
cording to manager people accepted this. “There are still some saying that it is too expen-
sive to travel only few stops and we don’t disagree on that. It is possibly too expensive to 
travel only a short trip in subway but the ticket is valid for 75 minutes and you can still 
change the mode and travel as long as possible.”  
 
SL has no clear results of the change. They were changing the discount groups while in-
creasing the prices, so they have difficulties to separate the effect of zone structure from 
other factors. Land use was not a relevant issue during the process. “The questions related 
to land use are more about house prices and new transport infrastructure investments but 
no tariff questions.” SL was neither looking whether people living further are financially 
doing well or bad. Stockholm has both suburbs consisting of low income flats and luxury 
villas on the beach.  
 
“I have trouble to find any bad things about this structure. Customers are satisfied and we 
are doing well. Main benefit is simplicity. One thing is contactless payment and travelling 
in public transport. I really don’t think we could implement contactless with zones. Ticket 
system is very central tool for us internally but customers really don’t care about the tick-
ets. They just don’t want it to be difficult. The best interface is no interface. If I had to 
choose between fairness and simplicity I would choose simplicity. Fairness is always very 
subjective but simplicity can be a shared experience. It is not something you can argue 
about“, manager describes. 
Vienna 
Vienna’s public transport is part of the Verkehrsverbund Ost-Region VOR, transport as-
sociation for Austria's eastern regions including parts of Lower Austria, the Burgenland 
and all of Vienna. The city of Vienna accounts for core zone, “Kernzone” or "Zone 
100", marked in the Figure 28 as blue area. The region around Vienna used to be divided 
to two different tariff systems: distance based and zone system, but in July 2016 the 
whole region started to use only distance based tariff.  
Vienna has two million people and geographical area around 415 square kilometres, 
which is a little larger than current AB-zone in Helsinki region. VOR area covers three 
provinces and the geographical area is 23 600 km². In total 745 municipalities belong to 
the area (Figure 28). There are 3,7 million people living in VOR area. Heavy rail ser-
vices are financed with 80 % by state but also by the provinces. Regional buses are fi-
nanced by provinces but some larger municipalities have their own internal bus services 
which are financed by these municipalities. All public transport within the City of Vi-
enna is financed by the city. 
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Figure 28. Flat tariff of Vienna and distance based tariff of VOR. Modified from wiki-
voyage: https://de.wikivoyage.org/wiki/Verkehrsverbund_Ost-Region_(VOR). 
 
City of Vienna have had flat tariff since 1982, when the current tariff system was estab-
lished together with the regional authority VOR. Flat tariff covers single, weekly, monthly 
and annual tickets. Single ticket is 2,40, monthly ticket 51 euro and annual ticket 365 euro. 
Annual ticket price was set in 2012 by political pressure and has not changed since. Ticket 
revenue covers roughly two third of transportation costs, when investments are not in-
cluded. Change from flat tariff to something else has never been discussed according to 
tariff manager of Wienerlinien: “This is working. This is a very clear system and everyone 
knows how to use the ticket. It is also easy to administrate and easy for invoicing. There is 
no need to change it.” Yet, Wienerlinien manager would like to change the pricing of an 
annual ticket. “The yearly ticket could be more expensive than 365 euros. Even if you look 
at the inflation, it should have changed. Market studies show that customers would pay 
more, because service level is that good. Very cheap yearly tickets have a decreasing im-
pact on the sales of monthly tickets or weekly tickets.” 
 
VOR was aiming to simplify their tariff in 2016. Trips are now cheaper for passengers 
travelling short trips between two former zones. Price calculation occurs automatically in 
distance based tariff, so people don’t have to remember zones. Flat tariff for the VOR re-
gion was not an option when the change was established in 2016. This was due to financial 
limitations. Financial manager of VOR emphasizes that distances of VOR area are large, 
wider than 200 km. “The distances you can travel are simply too big. The only flat tariff 
available for the whole area is a season ticket for school children, which costs 70 € per 
year”, financial manager of VOR describes. 
 
Paris 
 
Paris region Île-de-France is the widest of analysed regions with flat tariff covering the 
whole area. The region has 12 million residents and 12 000 square kilometres including the 
City of Paris with 2 million inhabitants. Île-de-France is divided into 8 regions and 1 276 
57 
 
municipalities (Figure 29). The costs are covered 27 % by customer and rest by companies 
and subsidies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29. Flat tariff area of the Île-de-France-Mobilités. Source: Wikipedia, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Île-de-France. 
 
Paris is perhaps the most interesting of flat tariff regions since they had zone pricing both 
for monthly tickets and single tickets for decades. Flat tariff for monthly tickets was estab-
lished in September 2015, three months before elections. The pressure for change came 
from politicians, especially from socialists and green party while right wing was opposing 
because of the financing. Single tickets have still zone pricing, so the setting is very similar 
to Stockholm tariff system before their change. Paris used to have 8 zones but less than in 
ten years the numbers shrank to one (Table 10). The introduction of all-zone passes ena-
bles subscribers to travel throughout the Île-de-France region at same 1-2 zone pass price 
prior to change. Before the change the monthly price was 70 euros for Paris and 116,50 eu-
ros for the whole region. After the change the flat tariff was 70 euros for all. Monthly price 
for all-zone pass is currently 75,20 euros.  
 
Table 10. History of pricing in Île-de-France-Mobilités. Source: Evaluation committee for 
the improvement of transit services in Île-de-France - Report for 2016. 
 
July 2007  Elimination of zones 7 and 8  
July 2011  Elimination of zone 6  
September 2012  Eliminating zones on weekends and 
public holidays 
Summer 2013  Eliminating zones for summer  
September 2015  Creation of All-zones passes 
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Regional transport authority Île-de-France-Mobilités (IDFM), who sets the prices, was 
against the change and they saw the effort coming from the left party as an attempt to win 
the elections. IDFM hired a transport consultancy to calculate changes before and after the 
change. The main arguments pro flat tariff was that cheaper tickets would cause people to 
use more public transport. Manager from IDFM opposes this interpretation. “That was not 
true. Problem is that people living far from Paris use their car not because public transport 
is expensive but because there is no public transport. Public transport is always less expen-
sive than car. Our calculations showed precisely that we have not reported move from car 
to public transport because of the price. It was just political thing to win votes.” 
 
IDFM reports that people are happy about the flat tariff but manager reminds, that if people 
need to choose between quality of the transport or the price, they always choose the quality 
of the service. Equity question is not seen relevant in the context of zones or flat tariff, 
since there are well off people in Paris but also far away in Versailles. Similarly, very poor 
neighbourhoods situate both near and far from Paris. Instead of geographical comparison, 
manager would analyse the social fairness of tariff between different income levels. “Poli-
ticians should concentrate on money rather than flat fair. People who have less money 
should pay less, but not only in the region but also in Paris.” 
 
In 2015 IDFM revenue was 3,4 billion euros. Organisation evaluated the direct revenue 
loss of change to be 450 million euros per year. The loss was collected from the companies 
of the region by increasing transport tax from 4 % to 6 %. In Paris region companies are 
forced to pay transport tax based on their pay roll. Now revenue is ten percent more, 3,8 
billion euros. The measure has had a positive impact on mobility for trips with an origin or 
destination in the suburbs (Figure 30). After the change trips have increased 2 to 3 % per 
year and IDFM has nowadays over 8 million trips per day. IDFM speculates that people 
living outside Paris region that used to take train from there to Paris now drive to the bor-
der of the region and take the monthly rate because it is cheap. They see no modal shift 
from car to public transport. Manager names poor service level at outer regions as a main 
reason for this. He is also suspecting a modal shift from walking and biking to public 
transport because people have shifted from using single tickets to monthly passes.  
 
 
Figure 30. Number of trips in RATP transportation services. Source: All-Zone Passes, 
what are the impacts two years after implementation? Brief summary 2018. 
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IDFM is satisfied with territorial equity of flat tariff but not to loss of money and pricing 
dynamics (Table 11). The authority considers flat tariff as decision that should not have 
been made. Instead they would have stopped price increases in outer regions and shrank 
the price differences between city and the region. Currently IDFM is studying distance 
based tariff, which seems attractive based on economic studies.  There is no political agree-
ment on the subject and huge investments are needed for contactless payments. IDFM aims 
to have distance based pay as you go tariff in 2022 for single tickets. For monthly passes 
they believe flat rate will remain. 
 
Table 11. Pros and cons of flat tariff in Paris region. Source: Evaluation committee for the 
improvement of transit services in Île-de-France - Report for 2016. 
 
 
 
 
                      
Strong       Existing         No                Partial             Significant 
improvement      improvement change        weakening       weakening 
 
 
Four flat tariff cities have their own characteristics based on the administrational struc-
tures, financing of regional public transport and the tariff history of the region. Turku and 
Stockholm represent cases where the flat tariff is in most intense use both in monthly and 
seasonal tickets. Paris on the other hand has the widest geographical area covered with flat 
tariff but only in monthly tickets. Vienna and VOR represent an example where flat tariff 
has so far remained only in the core city and is not expanding to the metropolitan region. 
Following table 12 presents the summary of the cases and evaluates also whether flat tariff 
had positive (+, ++, +++) or negative (-, --, ---) effects to key objectives of public transport 
authority or if there has been no effect at all (=) or the regional flat tariff is not in use (Ø). 
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Table 12. Comparison of flat tariff between cities. 
 
City region Turku/Föli Stockholm/SLL Vienna and VOR Paris 
Features of 
flat tariff 
system 
Both single and 
monthly tickets in 
flat tariff since 2014. 
Stockholm have had flat 
tariff for monthly passes 
from 1960’s.  Single 
ticket tariff was changed 
to flat in 2017. 
City of Vienna 
have flat tariff 
from 1982. Region 
harmonized tariff 
to distance based 
in 2016. 
Paris shifted from 
zones to flat tariff in 
2015. 
Geograph-
ical area, 
people 
1185 km² 
293 000 people 
6300 km² 
2,3 million people 
Vienna, 415 km², 
2 million people 
VOR, 23 600 km², 
3,7 million people 
12 000 km², 
12 million people 
Municipali-
ties 
6 municipalities 26 municipalities 3 regions, 745 
municipalities 
8 regions, 1 276 munic-
ipalities 
Revenues +/- +/- Ø - - - 
Usability +++ +++ Ø (+++ in Vienna) ++ 
Fairness/ 
Equity 
+ + Ø + 
Passenger  
growth 
 
+++ = Ø ++ 
Land use 
= 
= Ø = 
Process 
Authority+ politi-
cally driven 
Authority+ politically 
driven 
Ø Politically driven 
Financing  
public 
transport 
Ticket revenues, 
subsidies from local 
municipalities.  
Ticket revenues and re-
gional tax.  
Ticket revenues 
and subsidies 
from  
Ticket revenues, em-
ployer tax, local, re-
gional and national 
subsidies. 
Future 
plans 
New municipalities 
joining. Wants to 
keep flat tariff, but 
is not sure if it possi-
ble. 
Implementing contact-
less payments. Want to 
keep flat tariff, which 
enables easy user expe-
rience for contactless 
No significant tar-
iff renewals com-
ing.  
Studies contactless 
payments and wants to 
renew the tariff. Dis-
tance based tariff is 
considered attractive 
for single tickets.   
 
Easy usability is the most appreciated feature of flat tariff system in all cases. Parisian 
manager mention this only briefly but remembering how politicians pressed the authority 
to make the change, it is likely the authority has challenges to notice and report all the pos-
itive aspects of flat tariff. The discourse of flat tariff in Paris framework is critical and neg-
ative as Turku, Stockholm and Vienna are very much opposite. 
 
Four cases differ geographically a lot. When these cities are compared to Helsinki region, 
HSL is between Turku and Stockholm but closer to Turku. HSL area covers together 2031 
km², 1,2 million people and nine municipalities. A-zone is 48 km², B 264 km², C 491 km² 
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and D 1228 km². It seems that centralized regional governance and common financing cov-
ering both the central city and the region around it are some elements that makes it possible 
to favour comprehensive tariff solutions which flat tariff always is. When financing is not 
directly linked to municipality but coming from the regional or national level, it is easier to 
design the tariff system from the perspective of the majority and accept different subsidy 
levels in some marginal parts of the region. Could it be also that if public transport author-
ity is regional organisation, it creates pressure to harmonise tariff, i.e. it is not seen justified 
to have different prices in different parts of the region? 
 
In all cases of Turku, Stockholm and Paris it is striking that the level of flat tariff is either 
the same what the flat tariff was in the city centre or just slightly more. It seems that the 
phenomenon of loss aversion makes it difficult to shift to flat tariff unless the lowest prices 
remain quite steady and the public acceptance is guaranteed by this. Land use was not ac-
tively mentioned by any of the interviewees. When it was specifically asked, common re-
sponse was that flat tariff has no direct connection to land use. It seems that regions de-
velop their land use based on the service level of public transport rather than tariff levels. 
This goes hand in hand with the fact that supply elasticity is significantly higher in public 
transport than price elasticity, i.e., people react more to improvements on routes and acces-
sibility that increases/decreases of prices. 
  
Turku and Stockholm had similar processes: politicians had the will to change the system 
but they asked the authorities to prepare and analyse different potential models for the 
evaluation and gave them reasonable time to produce the deliveries. In Stockholm case 
politicians were exceptionally heavily involved in the process. Instead in Paris case the de-
cision seemed quick, hasty and dictated from the politicians to the authority. Differences in 
procedures can be heard in expert interviews but might be seen also in the successfulness 
of the final design of tariff. One must also remember that authorities driving for flat tariff 
are likely to have bias towards positive interpretation of the results. 
 
4.2 User preferences 
 
Two focus groups were held to discuss zonal model versus flat tariff and to compare their 
pros and cons. Some refers to distance based prising were mentioned but it was not dis-
cussed deeply. First group consist of regular users and second group random users. The 
comments from focus groups were organized under framework “Price-Usability-Fairness”. 
The answers favouring for flat tariff are marked with green and the answers opposing flat 
are marked with red. Neutral opinions were left as white. Such boxes are left empty where 
the participant did not comment the theme at all (Table 13 and 14).  
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Table 13. Regular users focus group opinions about flat tariff. 
 
ID Zone Price Usability Fairness Preferred model 
1 A Contradiction about flat tariff. 
Both best (usability) and worse 
option (potential price increase). 
Flat has best usabil-
ity 
 Flat tariff for ABC-area. 
2 C Van-
taa 
Flat tariff with current AB-price 
would free from calculating 
whether to travel or not travel. 
Would use more monthly tickets 
and take trips to other zones if 
flat tariff. Suggests tram ticket 
for centre in flat model. 
If flat tariff, would 
not have to think 
which ticket to use. 
Outer regions would win if 
there were flat tariff. Thinks 
zone model is fairer for prices 
but unfair for those living just 
on the other side of the border. 
Students, retired and kids 
should have cheaper ticket.  
Flat tariff because work 
place changes between 
Helsinki-Espoo-Vantaa-
Kauniainen. 
3 A Assumes flat tariff price would 
be higher than zone prices. Sug-
gest there could be cheaper sin-
gle ticket for shorter trips inside 
Helsinki.  
One zone model 
could make PT more 
workable since when 
people don’t have to 
think borders. 
Everyone wins in zone model 
except some Helsinki residents 
with very low income. Fears 
that in flat model poor people 
could not afford PT. Think 
zones can be a step towards flat 
tariff. The correlation of the 
trip length and price level is 
logical. 
First chooses flat tariff 
with moderate price. 
Thinks it is the future 
oriented model. In the 
end switches to zones 
because fears price level 
and the result that peo-
ple would stop using 
public transport. 
4 B Espoo Does not actively comment 
prices. Agrees others about the 
convenience of flat tariff is price 
is same as AB. 
 People living in B-zone are 
winners of zone model. Sees 
the correlation of the trip 
length and price level logical. 
Thinks zone model is fairer 
than flat tariff. 
Flat tariff. Price could 
be 70 €/month. Then 
later is willing to rec-
ommend number 7’s 
idea of flat tariff for 
ABC-area.  
5 B Espoo Is willing to pay max. 70 
euro/month in flat model. Would 
enable trips to parents or airport. 
Would like to use annual ticket. 
Praises the route fea-
ture in HSL applica-
tion, which tells the 
ticket needed for the 
route and enables 
buying. Thinks flat 
tariff would promote 
PT usage. 
Agrees with number three that 
flat price could be too high for 
poor people. Sees the correla-
tion of the trip length and price 
level logical. Assumes that 
people living in the city centre 
would be upset about flat tariff. 
Points out the high apartment 
prices in the centre. Thinks 
people with lower income 
should have lower prices.  
Zone model. Would like 
to have one zone ticket.  
6 D No cheaper single ticket for only 
centre but for the whole area.  
Thinks flat tariff 
would promote PT 
usage. 
Outer regions would win in flat 
price model.  
Flat tariff. 
7 B Hel-
sinki 
Is upset about price increase of 
single tickets in zones. In flat tar-
iff 2,80 € would not bother as 
much. Thinks 59 euros/month is 
already high. Hesitates about flat 
tariff if the price is not known. 
Thinks the ideal model for her 
would be flat tariff only for 
ABC-zones and D could have 
separate tariff. Don’t want 
cheaper centre area. 
When living in Vi-
enna found flat tariff 
easy. Wonders how 
people know where 
the zone border lo-
cates. Thinks two 
zone model would 
be clear, where ABC 
is one ja D the other. 
Four zone combina-
tions too compli-
cated. 
Thinks zones are somewhat un-
fair though good for her.  Con-
siders flat tariff fairer than 
zones if the price would same 
as AB.  
Flat tariff for ABC-area.  
8 C Espoo Agrees the convenience of flat 
tariff if the price is same as AB. 
  Flat tariff for ABC-area 
(no 7’s idea). 
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Table 14. Random users focus group opinions about flat tariff. 
 
ID Zone Price Usability Fairness Preferred model 
1 A Would choose flat 
even if 20 % 
higher price. 
 Thinks it would be fair if monthly 
prices for Helsinki residents would 
increase a little if it would enable 
lower prices to Espoo and Vantaa. 
Flat tariff 
2 C Vantaa     Flat tariff. 
3 C Espoo Would 20 % 
higher price in flat 
model make peo-
ple to take short 
trips with car? 
In flat system there 
would be no need for 
such pre-planning as 
with zone tickets. 
Thinks flat tariff would 
promote PT usage. 
Everybody should have some level 
accessibility.  
 
4 A   Reminds that many other facts like 
service level are more important 
than price. Considers zones fairer 
than the old municipal model. 
 
5 B Espoo Would choose flat 
over zones, if 
price is same as 
AB or even 20 % 
more. 
Flat price would save 
people’s money and 
nerves and make PT 
more attractive. Ran-
dom user has a problem 
with the zones, fear 
when one gets an in-
spection fee.  
Thinks municipality pricing is 
fairer than zones. 
In the beginning 
is favouring flat 
tariff but in the 
end chooses dis-
tance based pric-
ing. Thinks it is 
the fairest. 
6 B Espoo Flat is ok, if sin-
gle ticket is under 
3 €. If the price is 
too high, car us-
age would in-
crease. Nobody 
wants to pay too 
high price for 
short trip. 
Flat model has best us-
ability, travelling 
would be easier. Could 
increase the usage of 
PT. 
Thinks zone model is fair because 
travelling is priced evenly to both 
directions. 
Zone model. 
Thinks flat tariff 
has not been re-
searched enough. 
7 B Helsinki Would use PT 
even if price is 10 
% higher than 
now. 
Has positive experience 
of distance based tariff 
from abroad: don’t 
have to know anything 
about the destination or 
ticket prices. 
Thinks municipality pricing is 
fairer than zones. Suggests also 
such flat tariff where one could 
travel with single ticket only 30 
minutes.  
Distance based 
pricing because it 
would be fair for 
old people’s 
short trips. 
8 D Kirkkonummi Would choose flat 
if the price would 
be 10 % more 
than AB but not if 
20 % more. 
If flat tariff could be af-
forded, it would be 
much clearer. Also for 
tourists. Does not like 
the idea of distance 
based pricing because 
of the stress it would 
produce for traveller 
(taximeter effect).  
It would feel unfair if the short trip 
is too expensive. Yet sarcastic 
comment that “is it the only prob-
lem in the world that everyone is 
able to travel with same price”. 
Would like to see higher subsidies 
that would enable flat tariff. Thinks 
zones are fairer than flat tariff be-
cause there one pays only what he 
uses. ”But if there is will to lead 
the region strongly and use bigger 
subsidies for PT, then let’s choose 
flat tariff.” 
Zone model. 
Thinks flat tariff 
with maximum 
10 % increase 
would be fair. 
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All participants from regular user group were willing to choose flat tariff if the price would 
be the same as AB-ticket is now. According to Rawl’s veil of ignorance (Maxcy 2002, 
p.93) they were asked, what tariff model they would prefer if they did not know where they 
were living. The replies divided a little but still flat tariff was the most mentioned model. 
One of the group members invented the idea of flat tariff only for ABC-area, which re-
ceived support from the group.  
 
In the group of random users, most people were interested in flat tariff, if the flat price 
would be close to current AB price. Yet, when people where later asked to pick preferred 
model in the imaginary situation they don’t know their living location, the responses di-
vided between zone model, flat tariff, distance based tariff and no answers at all. Partici-
pants did not actively make remarks about land use or housing prices but when it was spe-
cifically asked, some saw that flat tariff could help the housing shortage of Helsinki. Stu-
dent from D-zone commented that flat tariff could offer possibilities for growth in Kirkko-
nummi and municipalities like Vihti might want to join HSL. Opposite comment came 
from another student living in A-zone, who commented zone model enabling dense urban 
development.  
 
Based on these conversations, regular public transport users who use prepaid seasonal 
products had more positive attitude towards flat tariff than random users. Flat tariff would 
offer them convenience of mobility without borders and stress. Random users were more 
worried about the pricing of the short trips which could explain their support for distance 
based tariff. However, people seem to perceive both positive and negative aspects of each 
tariff model gradually during the conversation and were ready to change their opinions af-
ter a new positive or negative perspective came up. Overall, none of the respondents in 
both groups had problems with flat tariff if the price would be the same as current AB-
ticket or just slightly more. Nobody in both groups was favouring zones in such case. Fur-
thermore, the fairness was not considered a problem in a situation where nobody has to pay 
more than current AB-price, even when some are using wider travel rights. However, if the 
flat tariff would cause significant price increases to some users, the experience of injustice 
rises quickly. When the random user group was asked what if the flat price would be 10 % 
or even 20 % more than AB-prices, there were still people both from A and C-zones 
choosing flat tariff. This implies that price level is critical factor for the acceptance of flat 
tariff.  
 
Furthermore, fourteen individual customer interviews were made about tariff preferences. 
For prepaid tickets presented three different option: personal zone, ABCD-zone model and 
flat tariff. People were also asked to choose their preference model. The results to flat tariff 
questions are presented in the table 15. The respondents having more positive attitude to-
wards flat tariff are marked with green and more negative with red. Neutral respondents 
are left white.  
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Table 15. Comments of flat tariff from individual interviews. 
 
ID PT 
us-
age 
Age Status Zone City Comments Own 
prefer-
ence 
Inter-
viewer 
1 Reg-
ular 
19 Unem-
ployed 
B Helsinki Uses wheel chair. Would visit more outer regions. Eco-
friendly solution because promotes to take long trips 
with PT. Nothing bad comes to mind. Easy to under-
stand. Clear. Fairer than zones because everyone pays as 
much. 
Per-
sonal 
zone 
Ari 
2 Ran-
dom 
67 Retired B Helsinki Don’t like this, because is retired and makes short trips. 
Good for those who travel on large area. Would increase 
travel costs. Makes one think, is it worth to take a trip 
with PT. No benefits for me. Easy to understand. Unfair 
to people making short trips.  
Per-
sonal 
zone 
Maija 
3 Don’t 
use 
PT 
36 Business 
manager 
C Espoo Very clear and not Helsinki centre focused. Would suite 
me but would not increase my PT usage. Would benefit 
me if I would make lot long trips with PT.  No need to 
know where and when one is travelling. Would increase 
usage to longer trips but does not courage to take short 
trips with PT. Perhaps not the optimal model. Trip 
length should correlate with price.  
No 
choice 
Maija 
4 Reg-
ular 
41 Chef not 
known 
Vantaa It should be reasonably priced. Difficult pricing task. 
Major users would benefit. Small increase in prices 
would not harm but if it would be high, then would con-
sider other modes. Evenly unfair to all.  
Zone 
model 
Maija 
5 Don’t 
use 
PT 
23 Student A Helsinki Would increase usage. Would attract plenty of travellers 
outside the region. Would not cost me a lot personally 
because usage of PT so little. Flat would be so much 
nicer. Easy to understand. Same price would unite peo-
ple. Really fair. Would promote travelling further with-
out a car. No need to worry about parking.  
Flat 
tariff 
Ari 
6 Ran-
dom  
23 Student, 
waitress 
A Helsinki Not reasonable if need is only for one kilometre and 
there is no other option than PT. This would be strange. 
Would diminish personal usage. Would feel unfair to 
pay same price as those travelling long. Unfair to people 
living in the city centre. Negative effects to them, posi-
tive effects to ones living further. Good that people liv-
ing far away would move more and would move with 
PT. Easy to understand. 
Zone 
model 
Ari 
8 Reg-
ular 
36 Physiother-
apist 
A Helsinki Short trip travellers would pay also the trips of longer 
travellers. Would mean price decrease personally but 
still think flat tariff is unfair. As soon kids would start to 
use PT, this would mean bankruptcy. Kids move on a 
small area and still the price is same. Good thing is that 
you know what you pay. Profitable for long trip travel-
lers. Would encourage to walk short trips. Feels unfair. 
Per-
sonal 
zone 
Maija 
9 Reg-
ular 
47 Assistant B Vantaa Would encourage to expand the mobility area. Now one 
always thinks should to go centre or to Jumbo. Easy to 
understand. Not going to happen though. Unfair if the 
trip is really short. But everything is not fair always. 
Good for me.  
Flat 
tariff 
Sari 
10 Don’t 
use 
PT 
43 System en-
gineer 
B Espoo Would be good for me but bad for short trips. Should 
pay according to your travelling. If flat tariff in use, how 
to define right price for long and short trip. It would be 
easy that the there are no different prices. One could al-
ways evaluate is this trip worth of this to me. Maximum 
charge like in London would be good. Then one can 
Flat 
tariff 
Maija 
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budget the ticket consumption. This would be fairer to 
all but short trip travellers could feel this unfair. I don’t 
think people coming further are privileged because they 
have worse connections and longer trips, poorer service. 
11 Don’t 
use 
PT 
55 Wine spe-
cialist 
- Porvoo Best option clearly, this would be really good. Can’t 
think of anything bad except too high pricing. Seem bad 
for Helsinki residents but good for Espoo and Vantaa 
residents. For outsiders this would be excellent.  
Flat 
tariff 
Sari 
12 Don’t 
use 
PT 
31 Unem-
ployed 
B Espoo Good for people travelling further but not for short trips 
where walking is not an option. Clarity is good, same for 
all. Challenging for those who would be suffering. Can’t 
please everyone. Neutral attitude personally. Would not 
effect on personal PT usage.  
Per-
sonal 
zone 
Sari 
13 Reg-
ular 
24 Waitress B Espoo Not fair to all. Zone model makes sense because it is 
based on how much you move. Here others would travel 
more with the same price. Clear model, easy to budget. 
Clear but not fair. Personally price would probably be 
the same. 
Zone 
model 
Maija 
14 Ran-
dom 
47 Areal man-
ager 
B Vantaa No problem if the price is reasonable. From the func-
tionality this would be good, you always know what trip 
costs. Equity is not ok. 3 € minimum price would be too 
high. Unfair for short trips. Personally would be quite 
good. Would not have effect on PT usage, service level 
issues are more important that ticket price.  
Zone 
model 
Sari 
15 Reg-
ular 
64 Retired D Kerava Better than zones. Fair to all. Easy to understand. Step 
towards free PT. Flat tariff could make people walk on 
short trips.  
Flat 
tariff 
Ari 
 
 
People are making similar comments both on positive and negative aspects of flat tariff. 
All the respondents make remarks about flat tariff being clear and easy to understand. 
Many comments are also given that flat tariff could increase the price level for short trips. 
People making long trips and living far from the Helsinki centre are seen as “winners” and 
short trip travellers in the city centre as “losers”. Comments are also given that flat tariff is 
either fair or unfair. Those who think this model is fair, arguments that everyone pays as 
much regardless of where one lives. Those commenting about unfairness refer to the trip 
length and that it is not right that someone is travelling more but still paying as much.  
 
Both people from A, B and D-zone (there is only respondent living in C-zone) are favour-
ing flat tariff, but people living in the city centre seem to be more negative towards flat tar-
iff that in the focus group. It also seems that people not using PT are giving only either 
positive or neutral comments about flat tariff. One reason could be, that zone model feels 
complicated for nonusers and the simplicity of flat tariff seems therefore attractive. 
 
General impression between focus groups and individual interviews is that there was more 
negative attitude towards flat tariff in individual interviews than in focus group discus-
sions. Few reasons can explain this. First is randomness, since there are only few people 
answering, and no statistical conclusion can be drawn from these. However, in focus group 
discussions people were mainly focusing to zone model vs. flat tariff and no other compet-
ing models were presented, so they had really time to evaluate all the negative and positive 
aspects of the model. In individual interviews flat tariff was the last model presented at the 
end of interview. People might have been already slightly tired, and some earlier presented 
competing concepts might have attracted participants so that the interpretation towards flat 
tariff is more negative. One relevant difference between focus groups and interviews was 
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that in the focus groups interviewer and participants elaborated the theme and speculated 
about the price level of flat tariff. This idea of having no losses for everyone made flat tar-
iff acceptable for all. As remembered, the question of unfairness was not relevant if no-
body loses anything even if someone benefits more than the other. This speculation of 
price levels was not present in the individual interviews which seemed to activate the nega-
tive emotions of losses. One notion is also that regular users of focus groups were clearly 
more interested in flat tariff than random users. One reason for this was the idea made by 
number 7. She suggested flat tariff just for ABC-area, which received support from other 
group members. The same idea did not pop up in the random group or in individual inter-
views. 
 
4.3 Effects on demand and ticket revenue 
 
The effects of flat tariff were calculated based on sales estimation for 2018 and sales for 
May 2019 using short-run elasticity values. Long-run effects were calculated only based on 
May sales. Two calculations produced quite different results for ticket prices. In the fall 
2018 HSL estimated annual sales of single tickets, value tickets and seasonal tickets for 
adults, children and discount groups account for 373 million euros. Numbers include tram 
tickets but no daily tickets. Tram tickets and value tickets are included under the category 
“single tickets”. 
 
Table 16 shows the results, if single ticket price for flat tariff would be close to AB ticket 
price and monthly ticket would cost 63,80 (coefficient 22 to single ticket). This price level 
follows roughly the principle of avoiding loss aversion, where current users would suffer 
no significant price increases. Elasticity calculations indicate that flat tariff could reduce 
total sales with 16 % and increase annual subsidies with 60 million euros. If financial ob-
ject is to remain ticket revenues, single ticket price should be around 4 euro. This would 
increase monthly ticket price close to 90 euro, which would have striking effect on de-
mand. Even with this significantly higher price level, the total sales would drop slightly but 
the demand for monthly ticket would decrease 14 % and monthly tickets as much as 24 %.  
  
Table 16. Short-run elasticity effects of flat tariff based on 2018 sales estimation. 
 
Tariff  PRICE SALES 
EUR 
TICKETS 
(piece) 
SINGLE 
TICKETS 
MONTH
LY TICK-
ETS 
CHANGE 
IN DE-
MAND 
CHANGE 
IN SALES 
Tariff 
2018 
Varies 372 996 
805 
62 024 
761 
59 100 
505 
2 924 
256 
0 % 0 % 
Flat 1 2,90/ 
63,80 
311 542 
800 
59 032 
833 
52 511 
964 
2 903 
387 
-5 % -16 % 
Flat 2 4/88 366 
591103 
49 776 
097 
44 630 
050 
2 496 
160 
-21 % - 2 % 
 
Same calculation was made after the zonal change based on sales data May 2019 from 
travel card system and mobile ticket system. Comparison was restricted to only sales data 
of 18+ HSL residents’ monthly (normal/discount) and single ticket purchases. Anonymous 
single tickets are missing from both calculations, but their share of the total sales is minor. 
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Children tickets and daily tickets are also missing but for the comparison they are not rele-
vant. The results show that price level of 3,3/35/69 € could collect same revenue as now 
with significantly lower prices than in the first calculation (Table 17). By average, only 15-
17 % price increases were needed. The zonal change is likely the main factor between dif-
ferent results, since zone prices have already “flattened” the tariff structure. Number of 
monthly tickets decreased 1,6 % and single tickets 3,5 %, mainly from AB-ticket users.  
 
 
Table 17. Short-run elasticity effects with price level 3,3/69 based on 18+ HSL residents’ 
sales May 2019. 
   
Old price 
€ 
New price 
€ 
Old sales 
pcs 
Old sales 
€ 
New sales 
pcs 
New sales 
€ 
Price  
elastic-
ity 
Single AB 2,8 3,3 2437891 6826096 2298583 7585325 0,32 
Single ABC 4,6 3,3 317279 1459481 345972 1141706 0,32 
Single ABCD 6,4 3,3 91708 586928 105922 349543 0,32 
Single BC 2,8 3,3 401757 1124920 378799 1250038 0,32 
Single BCD 5,4 3,3 19698 106369 22149 73093 0,32 
Single CD 4,2 3,3 25459 106928 27205 89776 0,32 
Single  D 2,8 3,3 26638 74585 25115 82881 0,32 
Monthly AB 59,7 69 109907 6561426 103743 7158269 0,36 
Monthly  ABC 107,5 69 17828 1916487 20126 1388716 0,36 
Monthly  ABCD 156,4 69 3808 595607 4574 315630 0,36 
Monthly BC 59,7 69 14120 842961 13328 919639 0,36 
Monthly BCD 115,8 69 865 100172 991 68372 0,36 
Monthly CD 98 69 533 52225 590 40688 0,36 
Monthly D 59,7 69 391 23325 369 25447 0,36 
Discount AB 32,8 35 47734 1565688 46582 1630362 0,36 
Discount ABC 59,1 35 8055 476056 9238 323316 0,36 
Discount ABCD 86 35 1253 107777 1521 53227 0,36 
Discount BC 32,8 35 5886 193048 5743 201022 0,36 
Discount BCD 63,7 35 410 26110 476 16673 0,36 
Discount CD 53,9 35 261 14065 294 10286 0,36 
Discount  D 32,8 35 247 8109 241 8444 0,36 
TOTAL 
   
3531726 22768362 3411562 22732452 
 
 
 
 
When current lowest prices constructed the price level (Table 18), calculation showed 25 
million extra annual (12 month) subsidy need for adult travel card and mobile sales. The 
total extra subsidy would be around 35 million euros at a rough estimate, when all children 
sales, daily tickets and sales outside HSL region are included. Interesting however, when 
using long-run elasticity values (Table 19), the need for extra subsidy is lower and demand 
grows more due to higher elasticity values of single tickets and monthly tickets. 
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Table 18. Short-run elasticity effects of flat tariff with AB-price level based on 18+ HSL 
residents’ sales May 2019. 
 
  
 
Old 
price € 
New 
price € 
Old sales 
pcs 
Old sales 
€ 
New sales 
pcs 
New sales 
€ 
Price 
elasticity 
Single  AB 2,8 2,8 2437891 6826096 2437891 6826096 0,32 
Single  ABC 4,6 2,8 317279 1459481 357007 999620 0,32 
Single  ABCD 6,4 2,8 91708 586928 108215 303002 0,32 
Single BC 2,8 2,8 401757 1124920 401757 1124920 0,32 
Single  BCD 5,4 2,8 19698 106369 22733 63652 0,32 
Single  CD 4,2 2,8 25459 106928 28175 78889 0,32 
Single D 2,8 2,8 26638 74585 26638 74585 0,32 
Monthly  AB 59,7 60 109907 6561426 109708 6582469 0,36 
Monthly ABC 107,5 60 17828 1916487 20664 1239819 0,36 
Monthly  ABCD 156,4 60 3808 595607 4653 279195 0,36 
Monthly BC 59,7 60 14120 842961 14094 845664 0,36 
Monthly  BCD 115,8 60 865 100172 1015 60906 0,36 
Monthly CD 98 60 533 52225 607 36438 0,36 
Monthly  D 59,7 60 391 23325 390 23400 0,36 
Discount AB 32,8 33 47734 1565688 47630 1571777 0,36 
Discount ABC 59,1 33 8055 476056 9336 308079 0,36 
Discount ABCD 86 33 1253 107777 1531 50532 0,36 
Discount BC 32,8 33 5886 193048 5873 193798 0,36 
Discount BCD 63,7 33 410 26110 481 15873 0,36 
Discount CD 53,9 33 261 14065 297 9813 0,36 
Discount D 32,8 33 247 8109 247 8140 0,36 
TOTAL    3531726 22768362 3598941 20696667  
 
 
 
Table 19. Long-run elasticity effects of flat tariff with AB-price level based on 18+ HSL 
residents’ sales May 2019. 
. 
   
Old 
price € 
New 
price € 
Old sales 
pcs 
Old sales 
€ 
New sales 
pcs 
New sales 
€ 
Price 
elasticity 
Single AB 2,8 2,8 2437891 6826096 2437891 6826096 0,6 
Single ABC 4,6 2,8 317279 1459481 391770 1096956 0,6 
Single ABCD 6,4 2,8 91708 586928 122659 343445 0,6 
Single BC 2,8 2,8 401757 1124920 401757 1124920 0,6 
Single BCD 5,4 2,8 19698 106369 25389 71088 0,6 
Single CD 4,2 2,8 25459 106928 30551 85542 0,6 
Single D 2,8 2,8 26638 74585 26638 74585 0,6 
Monthly AB 59,7 60 109907 6561426 109476 6568551 0,78 
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Monthly ABC 107,5 60 17828 1916487 23972 1438329 0,78 
Monthly ABCD 156,4 60 3808 595607 5639 338346 0,78 
Monthly BC 59,7 60 14120 842961 14065 843876 0,78 
Monthly BCD 115,8 60 865 100172 1190 71411 0,78 
Monthly CD 98 60 533 52225 694 41645 0,78 
Monthly D 59,7 60 391 23325 389 23351 0,78 
Discount AB 32,8 33 47734 1565688 47507 1567743 0,78 
Discount ABC 59,1 33 8055 476056 10830 357384 0,78 
Discount ABCD 86 33 1253 107777 1856 61236 0,78 
Discount BC 32,8 33 5886 193048 5858 193301 0,78 
Discount BCD 63,7 33 410 26110 564 18611 0,78 
Discount CD 53,9 33 261 14065 340 11216 0,78 
Discount D 32,8 33 247 8109 246 8119 0,78 
TOTAL    3531726 22768362 3659279 21165749  
 
 
4.4 Transport justice analysis 
 
Travel survey from 2012 showed the higher the income level, the more trips people make, 
especially with car (HSL, 2013, p. 43). Survey from 2018 (HSL 2019 a) has no income 
data but contains status data of employment. Table 20 shows no significant difference in 
the number of trips between all, unemployed and retired. Also, the usage of PT is on same 
level among all respondents, but retired people use PT significantly less than others. The 
length of trips and PT trips among unemployed and retired are considerably shorter than 
among all respondents. If flat tariff would mean price increases to cheapest prices, the 
change could affect these groups in HSL region. 
   
Table 20. 18+ inhabitants’ trips inside HSL region from HSL survey 2018. 
  
Number 
of peo-
ple 
Number 
of peo-
ple with 
PT trips 
Share of 
people 
with PT 
trips 
Number 
of 
trips/per-
son 
Number 
of PT 
trips/per-
son 
Aver-
age 
length 
of 
trips 
Aver-
age 
length 
of PT 
trips 
All 5690 1923 34 % 3,7 0,7 5,5 km 9,1 km 
Unemployed 173 58 34 % 3,5 0,7 3,9 km 7,6 km 
Retired 1683 330 20 % 3,4 0,4 3,7 km 6,9 km 
 
When comparing low income postal codes travel behaviour to whole region, the higher us-
age of PT is seen in all four postal codes (Table 21). Vallila 00550, which has the densest 
city structure and best accessibility, scores highest in PT usage. The length of all trips and 
PT trips seem to be in direct relation to the distance from Helsinki city centre. However, 
data includes only few PT respondents from 01360 and 02410, but the sales data confirms 
that residents of these postal codes are making fewer but longer and more expensive PT 
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trips than their neighbours in Helsinki. As the modal share of PT correlates with the availa-
bility, accessibility, affordability and time budget of PT, it is no surprise that 005550 and 
00940 scores higher than others with PT usage. Inhabitants of 02410 have less trips than 
others, while their PT trips are mainly long and expensive four zone trips (Figure 31). 
Probably, some trips in 02410 are unrealized due to service or budget restrictions. 
 
Table 21. Trip profile comparison between low income postal codes based on HSL survey 
2018 and sales data from May 2019. 
  
Average 
length of 
all trips 
Average 
length of 
PT trips 
Share of 
people 
with PT 
trips 
Number 
of 
trips/per
son/day 
Number 
of PT 
trips/per
son/day 
PT 
spend-
ing/May 
2019 
%-share 
of 
AB/ABC/
ABCD 
sales 
%- share 
of PT 
spend-
ing/in-
come  
Change 
of PT 
spend-
ing if flat 
tariff 
All 5,5 km 9,1 km 34 % 3,7 0,7 23 € 66/17/6 1 % _ 
00550 2,7 km 4,4 km 72 % 4,6 1,8 29 € 84/13/2 1,6 % 
 
00940 4,7 km 7,8 km 57 % 3,9 1,3 23 € 89/6/1 1,4 % 
 
01360 5,5 km 11,4 km 40 %* 3,9 0,8 25 € 6/61/1 1,4 % 
 
02410 8,5 km 18 km 43 %** 3,3 0,8 16 € 5/2/46 0,9 % 
 
*only 16 respondents with PT trips   ** only 10 respondents with PT trips 
 
 
Based on both trip data of postal codes (Figure 31) and sales data, it is likely that low-in-
come areas on C or D-zone are suffering transport poverty in the form of ticket price, 
availability, accessibility and time budget. Instead, low income areas of A and B-zones 
seem to have better situation with their transport services and budget. The analysis shows, 
that flat tariff with higher prices than current AB-price would have opposite effect on these 
regions. Flat price would improve transport affordability of 01360 and 02410 but would 
weaken it in 00550 and 00940. 
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Figure 31. Trip distribution of 00550, 00940, 01360 and 02410 based on GPS data from 
Telia and PT trips of 18+ residents from HSL survey 2018. 
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5. Discussion 
 
Next are presented the key findings as well critical comments both from literature review 
and empirical findings under each research questions.  
 
What are motives and experiences for flat tariff in different cities? 
 
In theory, flat tariff is the best tariff solution for cities with small deviation in PT trip 
lengths and the demand for services is even. This can be the case in cities, which have 
round and dense structure like Vienna. Also, in larger regions the share of longer trips 
might be low so that it is easier and more useful to have flat tariff than to design complex 
zone structure. In Stockholm case, the share of already flat tariff monthly tickets of total 
sales was 80 % and from single ticket passages 80 % were made only in one zone, so there 
was no real financial need to keep up the zone structure for only limited share of revenue. 
However, normally flat tariff has not the same capacity to collect ticket revenue as optimal 
zone structure, which has beaten both flat tariff and distance-based tariff in revenue simu-
lation study (Otto & Boysen 2017, p. 363). 
Simplicity is the main benefit for flat tariff mentioned by all tariff experts and PT users in 
Stockholm, Turku and Vienna. Simplicity relates to easy usage but also to implementation 
of tariff collection system. Stockholm is implementing contactless ticketing and flat tariff 
simplifies the technical implementation of the tariff system. Turku case had similar experi-
ence. All cities praised easiness of the flat tariff except Paris, which was politically forced 
to switch zones to flat tariff. Paris had experienced the financial losses of flat tariff harder 
than others, since the area and population inside the flat tariff is much wider than in other 
cities. Yet, just three years after the change, Paris region was collecting 10 % more ticket 
revenues than before the change. It seems that lower prices in outer regions have promoted 
new sales. Goal to promote PT usage of the outer regions was the outspoken motive for 
change in Paris region. Political debate emphasized the fairness for outer regions and PT 
usage there, while authority was sceptical and considered this as adulation of voters before 
the coming elections.  
There were two opposite fairness perspectives to flat tariff. One mainly coming from deci-
sion-makers and experts is that in outer regions people are having poorer service level, 
higher waiting times and longer travelling times. Therefore, it is not fair to make those us-
ers pay more. The opposite perspective of unfairness was coming people travelling short 
trips, usually living in the city centre. From theoretical perspective, marginal social costs 
are higher in the centre and therefore short trips should be more expensive there than in the 
suburbs, but for users this argument can be difficult to comprehend. Anyhow, marginal 
cost should flatten the tariff (Jansson & Angell 2012, pp. 150-151).  
 
In all cases of Turku, Stockholm and Paris it was striking that the level of flat tariff was the 
same what the lowest price was earlier or just slightly more. In Turku the strongest re-
sistance against zones came inside Turku citizens who would have located to more expen-
sive zone. Same aversion towards losses was seen also in Oslo in another study (Jansson & 
Angell 2012, pp. 150-151). Stockholm calculated whether they should have zones for 
monthly passes. The decrease in price of having just one zone monthly ticket was minimal 
but the price would have doubled for those travelling three zones. Nobody wanted that. 
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These findings support the loss aversion theory; people experiencing losses are emotion-
ally suffering more compared to joy of those having similar sized gains. 
 
Centralized financing for whole region is likely one element that enables regional flat tar-
iff.  In Vienna region, discussion about flat tariff has never occurred as two independent 
organisations, City of Vienna and VOR, are separately financed. However, Turku region is 
financed by independent municipalities, who have at least so far manager agree on flat tar-
iff subsidy model. Land use was not actively mentioned by any of the interviewees and 
seem to have no direct connection to tariff. More emphasis was given to service level im-
provements. Finally, good planning and design of tariff change must be notified as critical 
factor in successful tariff change. When planning was done poorly or in hurry, the results 
were weak and corrections were needed afterwards. Instead, careful planning, calculation 
and designing of flat tariff helped to avoid unexpected outcomes. 
 
Yet, this paper has studied only four empirical cases and few literature ones, which is a 
small sample among city regions, and between the cases like Vienna and Paris there are 
significant differences. No statistical generalisations should be drawn based on this data. 
Also, the true value of simplicity is difficult to evaluate. Paris user figures and sales have 
developed well after the sales collapse, but how they would have developed with zones?  
 
How HSL-customers see flat tariff? What elements make it attractive/non-attractive? 
 
Simplicity. That was constantly mentioned as the best element of flat tariff according to 
user respondents both in focus groups and individual interviews. Simplicity was the most 
appreciated feature, which would enable carefree travelling in the region, where one has no 
stress about the borders and travelling rights. This refers to existence of flat rate bias. 
When discussing distance based tariff, one respondent mentioned taximeter effect, the neg-
ative emotion of having “the monkey on the shoulder” while travelling (Lambrecht and 
Skiera 2006, pp 213-222).  Some respondents suggested flat tariff could encourage them to 
take trips outside current usage area, but some thought they have no need for larger travel-
ling. People not using PT, where favouring flat tariff, perhaps due to simplicity. 
 
Expensive price. This was the most common fear related to flat tariff. People had very in-
tuitive thought, that flat tariff would mean higher prices and they were especially worried 
about low income user groups such as students. The random users were more worried 
about the price, had more negative attitude towards flat tariff and seem to have pay-per-use 
bias. In focus groups discussions, the immediate response to flat tariff was “it would be re-
ally simple but probably expensive.” When elaborated more, people preferred flat tariff in-
stead of zones, if the price would the same or just 10 % more as AB-price. Some were will-
ing to choose flat tariff even if the price would be 20 % more. Based on these interviews, 
the zone model lacks positive user experience other than possibility to lower prices for 
shorter trip travellers. The association of high prices of flat tariff was so intuitive, that it 
seem people have no real understanding of the very small portion of people making long 
trips or the fact that cost of trip is not in direct relationship to the length of trip.  
 
Flat tariff was seen both fair or unfair. Those who think this model is fair, argument that it 
is fair that everyone pays as much regardless of where they live. Comments about unfair-
ness refer that it is not right that someone is travelling more, but still paying as much. 
However, when elaborated more, the fairness of flat tariff related very much to potential 
75 
 
price increases. If tariff change would mean nobody have to pay more than currently, 
hardly anyone would complain about the unfairness. As one participant replied: “It is not 
taken away from me if someone is allowed to travel with same price”. It was somewhat 
surprising, that envy factor was related mainly to situation, where short trip prices would 
increase.  People living in the Helsinki city centre were mentioned as “losers” and people 
living far away as “winners” in such situation. These comments were similar to user re-
sponses coming from Stockholm or Turku, though it must be remembered that the only 
few users were giving such feedback. Loss aversion can create very negative feelings and 
experience of injustice that are not easily compensated by the pleasure resulting from sim-
plicity of flat tariff.  
 
As a summary, people were struggling between simplicity and price, when evaluating the 
suitability of flat tariff. One of the participants in the first focus group invented the idea of 
flat tariff only for ABC-area as a compromise solution to this, which received strong sup-
port from the group and was chosen by many as their favourite choice. Though people 
were willing to pay extra for the simplicity, the real value of simplicity can’t be known 
based on these interviews. Assessing how much more users would be willing to pay for 
simplicity would require extensive revealed preference surveys. 
 
What effects flat tariff could have for ticket revenues, subsidies and usage of public 
transport in HSL region? 
 
In the fall 2018, 81 % of 18+ residents’ PT trips in HSL region were made inside one or 
two zones, and the rest of the trips were divided evenly between three-zone and four-zone 
trips. The sales of one or two zone tickets among 18+ was 76 % (Figure 24). Even the high 
share of lowest priced tickets, there is still substantial share of longer and more expensive 
trips. If the zone model will change the travel behaviour to direction where maximum 2-
zone trips would cover 90 % of all trips and sales, it could reasonable to think giving up 
zones. 
 
Elasticity calculations show that flat tariff can be implemented either so that revenue stays 
the same, extra subsidies are not needed but the usage drops, or that usage increases but 
need for subsidies grows from 35 to maximum 60 million euros annually. Remaining reve-
nues and increasing usage at the same time with flat tariff is not possible, unless the sim-
plicity has higher than expected value to users. Interestingly, if long-run elasticity effects 
are realized accordingly, the decrease or increase related to price changes will be stronger, 
and flat tariff shows smaller need for subsidy and higher demand.  
 
Calculations were made using the same coefficient to all data. However, due to loss aver-
sion, the effect of increased prices (AB-zone) would be more intense than effect of falling 
prices. Also, elasticity values are known to be higher in the outer regions than in the city 
centre (Litman 2004. p.40.) This could mean that higher prices have no such strong nega-
tive effect on A-zone as expected. On the other hand, the positive effects on C and D-zone 
could be stronger than calculations report. Transaction utility and mental accounting (Tha-
ler 1999) have also effects on monthly users, which elasticity values ignore. Consumers 
feel better off when they have paid a low average price for the goods consumed, and when 
flat rate for monthly price in decreased, the existing customers might decrease their PT us-
age and spent spared travel budget to other travel services. At worst, low-priced monthly 
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tickets could decrease PT usage. Instead, price increases of monthly ticket could result 
more trips taken. 
 
The principle of marginal social pricing would suggest that zone prices should be higher 
closer to the city centre and inner zones should be narrower (Jansson & Angell 2012). 
Therefore, travelled kilometres should be more expensive in the centre than in outskirts. As 
learnt from trip data, people living in A-zone are making shorter PT trips than residents of 
D. Applying marginal social pricing here would direct flattening the price difference be-
tween AB and ABCD-tickets but not having a totally unified tariff.  
 
As a summary, implementing flat tariff with current travel behaviour profile of HSL region 
is not recommended without prepare for extra subsidies. Only strong evidence of high 
value of simplicity of the system could cover price increases without extra subsidies. Qual-
itative data from HSL-customers, experiences from other cities or tariff literature do not 
support such strong interpretation. The usage of extra public money to flat tariff can also 
be questioned as the most efficient usage of subsidy. However, if flat rate would be imple-
mented with price increases, it could increase usage among existing monthly ticket cus-
tomers due to mental accounting. Flat tariff would also improve the PT usage on C and D-
zone. Better option for extra subsidies would still be price cuts in C- and D-zone and in-
vestments to service level of these regions. However, based on behavioural and elasticity 
literature, average elasticity values have problems to describe accurately the behavioural 
change for the whole region. Presented results from elasticity calculations should be there-
fore treated with caution, as they tend to underestimate effects in outer regions and overes-
timate effects in inner zones.   
 
What effects flat tariff have for least well-off people in HSL region? 
 
Low income neighbourhoods of HSL region appear heterogeneous, where outer regions are 
suffering from poorest service levels and highest prices. This double punishment increases 
transport poverty in C- and D-zone. If flat tariff price would be the same as current AB-
ticket price, all four analysed neighbourhoods would benefit. Subsidies would be heavily 
increased mainly in outer municipalities, since Helsinki-residents travel only little to C- 
and D-zone. If the price level of flat tariff would be significantly higher than current AB-
ticket, low income areas on A- or B-zone would suffer but neighbourhoods in C- or D-zone 
would likely benefit. However, low income postal codes of A- and B-zone seem to have 
significantly better transport services than on C- and D-zone (Figure 21). People living in 
Helsinki are travelling little outside AB-zone, so AB-priced flat tariff would not have ef-
fect on subsidies of City of Helsinki. 
 
Rubensson et al. found that in Stockholm, contrary to arguments leading the tariff change, 
the more distance-based the fare scheme is, the more it benefits lower income travellers. 
They concluded that move from zonal fare to a flat fare scheme was a regressive policy 
change (Rubensson et al. 2018, p.8). Yet, conclusion to favour distance-based tariff as best 
solution to least well-off people in Stockholm would be oversimplification. Tariff design is 
NP-hard problem and even if distance-based tariff is fairer to low-income people in Stock-
holm than flat one, most likely it is not the fairest solution. Also, kilometre-based tariff of 
Stockholm case can be criticized having same kilometre prices through the region and vio-
lating marginal cost principle. In the first place, must be questioned, why fare structure 
should be designed based on residence of worst or best-off residents. Such design principle 
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will generate over-subsidies to people. Main design principle for PT tariff structure should 
rather be maximum attractiveness and usage, while fairness is solved through targeted dis-
count pricing.  
 
What frameworks public transport organisations should utilize when they are planning 
tariff and pricing strategies? 
 
The study has reviewed theoretical literature related to PT pricing, experiences from other 
European cities, customer views, financial and demand impacts, travel behaviour in HSL 
region and transport justice analysis related to flat tariff. Based on the results, the ideal tar-
iff maximizes social benefits, is easy and attractive to users, promotes PT usage, supports 
efficient use of network and improves transport justice for least well-off. During the study 
process following frameworks have shown to be critical: transport economics, behavioural 
economics, marketing, service design, transport analysis and justice analysis (Figure 15). 
Table 22 presents main design principles for PT tariff both from the theoretical literature 
and study process. It is important to notice that some goals are conflicting, such as aim for 
simplicity and social marginal cost principle. Yet designing optimal tariff structure is com-
plex computational task, tariff planners should be able to define attractive fare structure 
through empirical data, knowledge and continuous learning. 
 
Table 22. Design principles for PT tariff planning. 
 
Use variety of qualitative and quantitative methods to analyse and design tariff.  
Study empirically passengers’ needs, behaviour and psychology.  
Analyse travel behaviour and trip profile of the region. 
Follow the social marginal cost principle to reasonable extent. Higher prices when and 
where the PT demand is highest. 
Increase prices for trips with lowest elasticity. Decrease prices, where elasticity is high-
est (Ramsey principle).  
Take into account both long-run and short-run elasticity effects as well as regional or 
situational elasticity effects.  
Design simplicity for passengers. 
Avoid loss aversion phenomenon on large scale. 
Promote steady buying, paying and usage with pre-paid products. 
Utilize sunk cost effect: remind people of what they have already paid. 
Promote flat-rate bias instead of pay-as-you-go usage. 
Include high priced products to product category to rise the reference price. 
Learn from customers, what builds sense of fairness. Do not guess or deduce results 
but use qualitative, empirical data.  
Analyse, which customers are suffering transport poverty, and improve their accessibil-
ity with targeted, efficient solutions. Don’t over-subsidize masses. 
Develop tariff through evolution, not revolution. 
Develop computational models to compare different tariff settings.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has showed that flat tariff in HSL region is realizable, but would demand extra 
subsidies if PT usage and customer satisfaction should be improved concurrently. Simplic-
ity has reported to be the main benefit of flat tariff both for users and for the system in 
HSL region. Experience of fairness is related to potential losses. If the price level of flat 
tariff would be the current lowest AB-level, feeling of injustice is not a major problem. In-
stead, if flat tariff is implemented with price increase to inner zones, negative emotion of 
“losers” is stronger than the joy of “winners”. Flat tariff with AB-price level would im-
prove transport justice for all users. Higher price level would improve transport affordabil-
ity for low income regions of C- and D-zone, but least well-off people in A and B-zone 
would suffer. Elasticity calculations showed that flat tariff is not the optimal model to max-
imize both revenue and usage unless the financial value of simplicity is higher than ex-
pected.  However, this paper does not define value of simplicity, which would need exten-
sive empirical tariff studies. Flat rate with higher prices than currently could increase usage 
among existing monthly ticket customers due to mental accounting.  
 
Study has showed that behavioural economics of buying and pricing is relevant framework 
when planning PT tariffs. Especially the phenomenon of loss aversion has shown to be 
critical in the process of tariff changes. Traditional economics and qualitative analysis of 
user experience include to tariff planner’s tool box, but they should be expanded with an 
understanding of passengers’ economical behaviour and quantitative methods of psycho-
logical pricing.   
 
Current trip profile in HSL region does not support the usage of flat tariff, though the share 
of short trips is considerable, 95 % of all trips and 81 % of PT trips are made inside one or 
two zones. However, the number of two-zone PT trips should be close to 90 % to rational-
ize flat rate. The expansion of HSL-region would also be financially more problematic in 
flat tariff system. Instead of flat tariff, HSL is recommended to lower prices of 3- and 4-
zone trips, which is justified based on social marginal cost principle and stronger elasticity 
effects to outer zones. Also, the revenues from the potential future road pricing should be 
targeted for extra subsidies and service level improvement in C- and D-zones, whose resi-
dents would be most affected by road pricing. Paper criticizes also the usage of geograph-
ical tariff structure as the most efficient tool to distribute transport justice. Instead are rec-
ommended targeted subsidies to least well-off passengers. 
 
Most relevant lesson during the abductive research process was finding of behavioural eco-
nomics for public transport pricing. Applying loss aversion theory to PT pricing was criti-
cal, since it explains the common phenomenon, where unsatisfied passengers are always 
louder than satisfied ones. One surprising observation was, at least to the author, that large 
share of short trips in HSL region. One unexpected finding was the lack of envy in situa-
tions, where extra discounts are distributed only to some, but no other suffers or is less ad-
vantaged.  
 
Few limitations need to be mentioned. This paper includes no evaluation of all potential 
tariff solutions. Study focuses strictly to evaluate flat tariff for HSL region compared to 
zone model. Yet, some remarks are made about distance based tariff, since it is the full op-
posite to flat tariff. It is important to emphasize that no statistical conclusions can be drawn 
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based on qualitative focus groups, individual interviews and four other city cases. If new 
groups would be organized, some different arguments might likely come into sight.  
 
Quantitative analyses have limitations as well. Elasticity values used in this study are gen-
eral and they do not take into consideration the elasticity differences between different 
trips, zones or time of travel. Also, behavioural effects of transaction utility, mental ac-
counting, flat-rate bias, sunk-cost effect, awareness of payments and utility value of sim-
plicity have been recognized, but their true financial effects have not been evaluated, since 
it would require quantitative revealed preference studies.  
 
Finally, the potential weaknesses of this case study are reviewed using Easton’s three crite-
ria (Easton 1995, p. 379): a. case studies are just descriptions of events b. limited data pro-
vides partial support of theories and is used as quasi-deductive theory testing c. multiple 
case studies are used as statistical generalisation. In this study, all main problems have 
hopefully been avoided. Paper has tried to analyse and argument the process and reasons 
behind the flat tariff development in city cases. Also, this paper has versatile and deep the-
ory review to avoid the second problem as abductive methodology recommends. The rejec-
tion of statistical generalisation has emphasized several times during the process. However, 
main weakness of this study is the lack of quantitative method for behavioural effects of 
tariff, since behavioural theories were found just after the empirical data gathering process.  
 
For future research suggestions HSL is recommended to make travel survey at earliest one 
year after the zonal change to analyse, how people’s travel behaviour has changed and 
what is the current travel profile of zones. Large scale revealed preference study is needed 
to test behavioural pricing theories and examine new ones. Also, examining price elastici-
ties more detailed for different type trips in different zones would be useful for future tariff 
development. Peak-pricing is also one pricing option worth to study. Finally, computa-
tional tools to analyse tariff models should be developed while knowing that optimal 
model can hardly be found, but a few very good options can be identified.  
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Appendix 1. Interview form for city interviews 
 
Part 1: Overall historical timeline 
1. What is the current tariff system setup? 
2. What kind of setup was before the current tariff system setup? 
3. When has the change been made?  
4. Have you had some time of transition from one tariff system to another?  
5. Did you give up zones totally or just a) monthly tickets b) single tickets? 
 
Part 2: Reasoning for changes in relation to timeline 
1. Who (people and/or organisations) has been involved in designing the change of 
tariff system? 
2. Who (people and/or organisations) has been involved in the decision-making 
process for changing tariff system? 
3. Who (people and/or organisations) approved the change of tariff system? 
4. What were all the reasons considered for introducing the current tariff system?  
5. What were all the reasons considered for introducing the previous tariff system? 
(if applicable) 
6. What were alternative tariff systems considered when deciding about the current 
tariff system? 
7. What were users’ opinions about the current tariff system before the change? 
8. What are current users’ opinions about the current tariff system after the change? 
9. Were there any particularly unsatisfied user groups opposing the change?   
10. What were the main challenges in the decision-making process?  
11. Have you considered distance based or time based differentiation of pricing?  
 
Part 3: Effects after introducing flat tariff system 
1. What are the effects from having a flat tariff system in your city on:  
a) Modal distribution  (all modes) 
b) Number of trips 
c) Accessibility to jobs and services 
d) User satisfaction 
e) Fare recovery ratio (or amount of operational costs covered through 
ticket revenue) 
f) Housing pricing 
g) Land use changes 
h) Greenhouse gas emissions 
i) Any other effects 
 
2. What are some main pros/strengths of your current tariff system?   
3. What are some main weaknesses/cons of your current tariff system? 
4. Would you change your current tariff system in any way? 
 
Part 4: Conclusion 
1. Any other comments about your tariff system and lessons learned? 
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Appendix 2. List of case study documents 
 
 
TURKU 
 
• Kalenoja H., Metsäpuro P. & Wallander J. 2012. Turun seudun joukkoliikenteen 
maksujärjestelmäselvitys. Joukkoliikenteen maksuvyöhykkeet ja lippujärjest-
elmävaihtoehdot. Tampereen teknillinen yliopisto: Liikenteen tutkimuskeskus 
Verne. Tutkimusraportti 82. ISBN 978‐952‐15‐2864‐4. 
 
• Ramboll, Turun kaupunkiseudun joukkoliikenteen ennen-jälkeen tutkimus 
 
• Trafix, 2017. Selvitys nykyisen Föli-alueen tariffivyöhykkeistä. 
 
 
STOCKHOLM 
 
• Beslutsunderlag gällande SL:s zonsystem. Delrapport inom Parlamentarisk 
utredning kring priser, taxesystem och biljett- och betalsystem. Trafikförvalt-
ningen, 2016. 
 
• Utredning gällande prissättning för SL:s enkel- och periodbiljetter. Delutredning 
inom Parlamentarisk utredning kring priser, taxesystem och biljett- och betalsys-
tem. Trafikförvaltningen, 2016 
 
• Bilagor till Beslutsunderlag gällande SL:s zonsystem. Delrapport inom Par-
lamentarisk utredning kring priser, taxesystem och biljett- och betalsystem. Traf-
ikförvaltningen, 2016. 
 
• Utvärdering av enhetstaxa. Trafikförvaltningen slutrapport. Susanna Nissar, 
Fredrik Bergfalk, Jenny Annebäck, 2017 
 
• Zoner från 1 april, press release of SL, http://www.mynews-
desk.com/se/sl/pressreleases/zoner-fraan-1-april-126519 
 
 
PARIS 
 
• Evaluation committee for the improvement of transit services in Île-de-France. 
Report for 2016, English translation. 
 
• All-Zone Passes, what are the impacts two years after implementation? Brief 
summary, English translation, 2018. 
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Appendix 3. Interview form for focus groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interview protocol 
Project Title: Master thesis: Analysis of one zone system effects for HSL and delinea-
tion of alternative models 
 
Date and Time: _________________________ Location:
 _____________________________ 
Respondent:   __________________________ Title:
 ____________________________________ 
Interviewer:  Mari Flink 
Time available for interview:
 ____________________________________________ 
Guidelines for introduction (5-10 mn) 
1. Thank informant for the interview. The goal of this interview is to …. 
2. An explanation of your rights as a participant in an academic research pro-
ject, including those that concern the Finnish Personal Data Act. Ask partici-
pant if they have any questions. Sign consent form and give them a copy to 
keep, along with a copy of the Finnish Personal Data Act. 
3. The interview will take about 60 min.   
4. Ask them if they have any questions before starting. 
5. Ask the participant for permission to record (remind him/her of option not to 
record) and check everyone is comfortable, sound is good etc.  
Start recording 
 
Current tariff system 
Short presentation of the current model.  
4 
 
 
 
1. What do you think about the current pricing model of HSL? Pros and cons?  
2. How well does the current system serve customers’ travel needs?  
3. How fair the current HSL tariff system is now? 
 
ABCD-model 
 
Short presentation of the ABCD model: A: 260 000 B: 600 000 C: 240 000 D: 
136 000 (inhabitants) 
 
 
 
1. What do you think about the ABCD model of HSL? Pros and cons?  
2. How well does this zone model support people’s travel needs?  
3. What do you think about the principle that the price is dependent on the 
length of the trip? 
4. Hoe easy or difficult it is to understand how many zones you need to buy? 
5. How easy or difficult it is to understand how much you need to pay? 
6. How fair the ABCD model is? 
7. What do you think, where and who are the biggest winners and losers of 
ABCD pricing model? 
5 
 
 
 
2. Flat tariff model 
 
 
 
1. What do you spontaneously think about introducing flat tariff? Pros and 
cons. 
2. If the flat tariff would be the same as AB price now, which model would you 
choose: flat or ABCD? 
3. How much higher price for flat tariff compared to AB price would be justi-
fied? 
4. Which of the models you believe would promote usage of public transport 
best? 
5. If you could decide whether HSL have zones or flat tariff, which one you 
would choose? 
6. Do you consider flat tariff to be fairer than zone tariff? 
 
Distance-based tariff: 
 
 
6 
 
 
Justice question:  
 
1. If you didn’t know your place of residence, income level, education, car 
ownership etc. but randomly end up living at some part of HSL region based 
on the probability people are now located in the zones, which one of the 
models would you choose? Why? 
2. What does “fairness” of the transport system and pricing mean to you? 
3. From your opinion, who are the most disadvantaged people in Helsinki re-
gion and whose mobility needs and improvement of accessibility should be 
ensured particularly? 
4. Which one of these three model you consider as fairest to all? Which one of 
these three model you consider fairest to least advantaged people? 
 
Conclusion 
 
2. Any other comments about tariff systems, pricing and paying? 
3.  
Finish 
1. Thank participant.  
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Appendix 4. Interview form and materials for individual 
interviews 
 
Tunnistepohjaiset taustajärjestelmät: Haastattelurunko (23-31.10) 
Haastattelija täyttää 
Nimi: 
Ikä: 
Perhe: 
Asuinkunta ja vyöhyke: 
Alustus: 
 
Hei ja kiitos ajastasi! Olemme tutkimassa pääkaupunkiseudun asukkaiden ja turistien 
tottumuksia joukkoliikenteen käytöstä, ja miten uudet mahdolliset hinnoittelumallit ja 
liikennöinnin muodot voisivat vaikuttaa omiin valintoihin. Kaikkia vastauksia käsitel-
lään luottamuksellisesti, ja haastattelua nauhoitetaan pelkästään tutkimuksen helpot-
tamiseksi. Näkemyksiäsi ja vastauksiasi emme esitä yksilötasolla, ja toivomme, että 
vastaisit näihin kysymyksiin rehellisesti. Ennen kuin aloitamme, pyytäisimme jos voisit 
allekirjoittaa tämän tutkimusluvan. Palkkioksi osallistumisestasi on vaihtoehtoisesti 
50:n euron HSL:n lahjakortti, jota voit käyttää kaikkiin HSL:n tuotteisiin tai Stockman-
nin 50 euron lahjakortti. (ojenna tutkimuslomake ja odota, että asiakas perehtyy 
sisältöön ja allekirjoittaa) Jos ei ole muita kysymyksiä, niin aloitetaan… 
Taustatiedot: 
● Kerro aluksi nimesi ja ikäsi 
● Miten kuvailisit itseäsi joukkoliikenteen käyttäjänä? 
● Käyttääkö joku muu perheestäsi joukkoliikennettä? 
● Onko perheessänne yksityisautoa(ja)? 
Tehtävä 1: Liikkumisen nykytila 
Pyydä asiakasta merkitsemään oma elinpiirinsä pääkaupunkiseudun kartalla. 
● Merkitse kartalle paikat, joissa käyt tavallisesti viikoittain. 
○ Auta tarvittaessa: esim. koti, työpaikka (jos ei työtön), ruokakauppa, yksi 
harrastus (esim. kuntosali) 
○ JOS asuinkunta ei ole pk-seutu, pyydä merkitsemään paikat, joissa 
tavallisesti käy vieraillessaan pk-seudulla. 
● Millä tavalla siirryt paikasta toiseen? 
○ Mitä reittejä hän käyttää? 
○ Onko kyseinen reitti mieluisa vai ei? 
● Mihin aikaan päivästä siirtymiset yleensä sijoittuvat? 
Haastattelu tehdään korttien avulla. Ensin käymme 6 tarinaa erilaisista hinnoittelumal-
leista ja sen jälkeen 3 matkustusalueeseen liittyen . Lopuksi vielä käymme 4 tarinan 
kautta läpi, miltä joukkoliikenne voisi näyttää tulevaisuudessa tavallisen työmatkalaisen 
näkökulmasta . 
Tehtävä 2: Hinnoittelumallit 
Nyt esitämme sinulle useita eri ehdotuksia joukkoliikenteen mahdollisista 
hinnoittelumalleista. Toivoisimme, että kerrot rehellisesti mielipiteesi ja näkemyksiäsi 
jokaiseen ehdotukseen. Yhteensä näitä eri malleja on 6 ja niitä on avattu eri tarinoiden 
muodossa. Huomioi, että tässä tarkastelussa jokainen vaihtoehto toimii omana 
itsenäisenä kokonaisuutena, eikä täydennä muita mahdollisia skenaarioita. 
Jokaisen vaihtoehdon kohdalla, pyydä asiakasta perehtymään kortin sisältöön ensin, en-
nen kun hän vastaa kysymyksiin. 
Vaihtoehto 1: Pikalinja vai Maisemalinja 
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● Miltä tuntuisi, jos joukkoliikenteen hinta määräytyisi reitin suoruuden ja 
nopeuden perusteella? Miksi? 
● Miltä tämä hinnoittelumalli näyttäisi sinun omassa arjessasi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on hyvää? Miksi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on huonoa? Miksi? 
● Onko matkan suoruuteen ja nopeuteen perustuva hinta helppo ymmärtää? 
Miksi / Miksi ei? 
● Miten uskot että tällainen hinnoittelu vaikuttaisi oman matkustuksesi hintaan? 
Miksi? 
Vaihtoehto 2: Bussilinjaosuuskunta 
● Miltä tuntuisi, jos joukkoliikenteen vuoroväleihin pystyisi vaikuttamaan 
maksamalla itse enemmän? Miksi? 
● Miltä tämä hinnoittelumalli näyttäisi sinun omassa arjessasi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on hyvää? Miksi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on huonoa? Miksi? 
● Onko ajatus bussilinjaosuuskunnasta helppo ymmärtää? Miksi / Miksi ei? 
● Miten uskot että tällainen hinnoittelu vaikuttaisi oman matkustuksesi hintaan? 
Miksi? 
● Pystytkö samaistumaan Rolfin tilanteeseen? 
○ Minkä tyyppisiä haasteita sinulla on liikkumisesi ja vuorovälien tiheyteen 
kanssa? 
● Olisitko itse valmis liittymään bussilinjaosuuskuntaan? Miksi? 
Vaihtoehto 3: Ruuhkahinnoittelu 
● Miltä tuntuisi, jos joukkoliikenteen hinta vaihtelisi ruuhka-aikojen perusteella? 
Miksi? 
● Miltä tämä hinnoittelumalli näyttäisi sinun omassa arjessasi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on hyvää? Miksi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on huonoa? Miksi? 
● Onko ruuhka-aikoihin perustuva hinta helppo ymmärtää? Miksi / Miksi ei? 
● Miten uskot että tällainen hinnoittelu vaikuttaisi oman matkustuksesi hintaan? 
Miksi? 
● Vaikuttaisiko tämän kaltainen hinnoittelumalli jotenkin sinun omaan 
liikkumiseesi? 
○ Motivoiko halvempi hinta käyttämään joukkoliikennettä enemmän kun ei ole 
ruuhkaa? 
○ Miksi / Miksi ei? 
Vaihtoehto 4: Päästöpisteet 
● Miltä tuntuisi, jos joukkoliikenteen hinnasta voisi saada alennusta valitsemalla 
ympäristöystävällisempiä liikkumisen tapoja? Miksi? 
● Miltä tämä hinnoittelumalli näyttäisi sinun omassa arjessasi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on hyvää? Miksi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on huonoa? Miksi? 
● Onko ajatus päästöpisteistä helppo ymmärtää? Miksi / Miksi ei? 
● Miten uskot että tällainen hinnoittelu vaikuttaisi oman matkustuksesi hintaan? 
Miksi? 
● Vaikuttaisiko tämän kaltainen hinnoittelumalli jotenkin sinun omaan 
liikkumiseesi? 
○ Motivoisiko tämän kaltainen pisteytysohjelma kävelemään tai pyöräilemään 
lisää? 
Vaihtoehto 5: Kilometrihinnoittelu 
● Miltä tuntuisi, jos joukkoliikenteen hinta perustuisi suoraan paikkojen väliseen 
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etäisyyteen? Miksi? 
● Miltä tämä hinnoittelumalli näyttäisi sinun omassa arjessasi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on hyvää? Miksi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on huonoa? Miksi? 
● Onko etäisyyteen perustuva hinnoittelu helppo ymmärtää? Miksi / Miksi ei? 
● Miten uskot että tällainen hinnoittelu vaikuttaisi oman matkustuksesi hintaan? 
Miksi? 
Vaihtoehto 6: Matkustusaikahinnoittelu 
● Miltä tuntuisi, jos joukkoliikenteen hinta perustuisi suoraan matkustusaikaan? 
Miksi? 
● Miltä tämä hinnoittelumalli näyttäisi sinun omassa arjessasi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on hyvää? Miksi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on huonoa? Miksi? 
● Onko matkustusaikaan perustuva hinnoittelu helppo ymmärtää? Miksi / Miksi 
ei? 
● Miten uskot että tällainen hinnoittelu vaikuttaisi oman matkustuksesi hintaan? 
Miksi? 
● Kumpi on mielestäsi reilumpi hinnoitteluperuste: etäisyys vai matkustusaika? 
Miksi? 
Lyhyt tauko (5 min). 
Nyt käydään vielä läpi 3 erilaista vaihtoehtoa siitä millä perusteella matkustusalue voisi 
määräytyä. Voit käyttää näiden arvioimisessa apuna tätä karttaa, joka piirrettiin sinun 
omasta liikkumisestasi. 
Vaihtoehto 7: Omavyöhyke 
● Miltä tuntuisi, jos matkustusalueen rajat saisi määritellä itse? Miksi? 
● Miltä tämä hinnoittelumalli näyttäisi sinun omassa arjessasi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on hyvää? Miksi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on huonoa? Miksi? 
● Onko ajatus omavyöhykkeestä helppo ymmärtää? Miksi / Miksi ei? 
○ Pystyisitkö helposti määrittelemään omavyöhykettäsi? 
● Miten uskot että tällainen hinnoittelu vaikuttaisi oman matkustuksesi hintaan? 
Miksi? 
○ Kuinka usein uskot että matkustaisit omavyöhykkeen ulkopuolella? Viikottain? 
Kuukaudessa? 
Vaihtoehto 8: Vyöhykemalli 
Tämä on malli joka on astumassa voimaan ensi vuonna. 
● Onko tuleva vyöhykemalli sinulle entuudestaan tuttu? 
● Miltä tuntuu että matkustusalueet on rajattu kuntarajoista riippumattomina 
vyöhykkeinä? Miksi? 
● Miltä tämä hinnoittelumalli näyttäisi sinun omassa arjessasi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on hyvää? Miksi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on huonoa? Miksi? 
● Onko vyöhykemalli helppo ymmärtää? Miksi / Miksi ei? 
○ Osaatko suurin piirtein sanoa millä vyöhykkeillä oma elinpiirisi sijaitsee? 
● Miten uskot että tällainen hinnoittelu vaikuttaisi oman matkustuksesi hintaan? 
Miksi? 
Vaihtoehto 9: Tasatariffi (eli tasahinnoittelumalli) 
Tässä mallissa kaikki matkat ovat saman hintaisia, pituudesta ja ajasta riippumatta. 
● Miltä tuntuisi, jos samalla hinnalla saisi matkustaa koko HSL-alueella? Miksi? 
● Miltä tämä hinnoittelumalli näyttäisi sinun omassa arjessasi? 
● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on hyvää? Miksi? 
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● Mikä hinnoittelumallissa on huonoa? Miksi? 
● Onko tasahinnoittelu helppo ymmärtää? Miksi / Miksi ei? 
● Miten uskot että tällainen hinnoittelu vaikuttaisi oman matkustuksesi hintaan? 
Miksi? 
● Vaikuttaisiko tämän kaltainen hinnoittelumalli jotenkin sinun omaan 
liikkumiseesi? Jos, niin miten? 
● Kuinka reilulta tai epäreilulta tasatariffi vaikuttaa seudun eri ihmisten 
näkökulmasta? 
○ Kuinka reilua tai epäreilua se on henkilökohtaisesti? 
○ Entä miten reilulta tai epäreilulta se vaikuttaa pääkaupunkiseudun eri ihmisten 
näkökulmasta? 
Tehtävä 3: Teemalliset skenaariot 
Seuraavaksi käymme läpi neljä erilaista tarinaa siitä, miten eri tavoin toimiva joukko-
liikenne vaikuttaisi tavallisen työmatkalaisen liikkumiseen. Tarinoiden pohjalta 
keskustelemme siitä, että millaiseen suuntaan joukkoliikenteen pitäisi sinun mielestäsi 
kehittyä. 
Esimerkit 1-3, käydään läpi yksi kerrallaan: 
● Miltä tuntuisi, jos oma päivittäinen toistuva matkasi, esimerkiksi työmatkasi, 
toimisi tällä tavalla? Miksi? 
○ Mikä tarinassa on hyvää? Miksi? 
○ Mikä tarinassa on huonoa? Miksi? 
● Miten hyvin tätä tarinaa ohjaavat arvot heijastelevat sinulle itsellesi tärkeitä 
asioita? (kortin alalaita) 
Esimerkki 4 
Tämä tarina kuvaa sitä miten joukkoliikenne nykyään toimii. 
● Miltä joukkoliikenteen nykytila tuntuu äsken näkemiisi tarinoihin verrattuna? 
○ Mikä nykytilassa on hyvää? Miksi? 
○ Mikä nykytilassa on huonoa? Miksi? 
● Miten hyvin tätä tarinaa ohjaavat arvot heijastelevat sinulle itsellesi tärkeitä 
asioita? (kortin alalaita) 
Näissä neljässä tarinassa kerätään dataa ja tietoa ihmisten liikkumisesta ja hyödynnetään 
eri tavoin. (jos asiakas kysyy: tällä hetkellä kerätään tietoa eri liikennevälineiden mat-
kustajamääristä, mutta ei esimerkiksi tiedetä minne ihmiset ovat matkalla ja missä jä-
ävät pois kyydistä) 
● Miltä tuntuisi, jos tietoa sinusta ja sinun liikkumisestasi käytettäisiin liikenteen 
suunnitteluun? 
○ Mitä hyvää datan käyttöön liittyen tarinoissa on? Miksi? 
○ Mitä huonoa datan käyttöön liittyen tarinoissa on? Miksi? 
● Miltä tuntuisi, jos joukkoliikenteen toiminnan takana olisi nykyistä 
kehittyneempää teknologiaa? 
○ Esim. esimerkeissä 1 ja 2 palvelu osaa aikatauluttaa Annan matkoja automaattisesti. 
Miltä tämä tuntuu? 
○ Tai esimerkiksi tunnistautumiseen liikennevälineessä ei enää käytettäisi matkakorttia, 
vaan tunnistautuminen tapahtuisi esim. Matkapuhelimen tai kasvojen tunnistuksen tai 
sormenjäljen avulla. 
● Mikä esimerkeistä on mielestäsi kerätyn tiedon ja datan sekä teknologian näkökul-
masta paras? Miksi?  
Tarinoista osassa joukkoliikenne keskittyy enemmän yksilön hyödyn tavoitteluun, kun 
taas toisissa yhteinen etu ja tasa-arvo ovat tärkeämpiä. 
● Miten paljon yksilön edusta voi mielestäsi tinkiä, jotta kaikille 
pääkaupunkiseudulla pystyttäisiin takaamaan tasavertainen ja tasalaatuinen 
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palvelu? Miksi? 
● Mikä esimerkeistä on mielestäsi yksilön ja yhteisön etujen tasapainottamisen 
näkökulmasta paras? Miksi? 
Tehtävä 4: Oma malli 
Seuraavaksi pääset rakentamaan sinun omasta mielestäsi parhaan mahdollisen 
joukkoliikenteen hinnoittelumallin. Voit valita sinisistä korteista 1-2 parasta ja 
vaaleanpunaisista korteista yhden. Jos hinnoittelun pitäisi mielestäsi toimia ihan jollain 
muulla tavalla kuin mitä näissä korteissa on esitetty, voidaan yhdessä piirtää sinun oma 
ideasi ylös. 
(Anna asiakkaalle aikaa valita kortit) 
● Esittelisitkö, millaisen mallin olet rakentanut? 
● Miksi hinnoittelun pitäisi mielestäsi toimia tällä tavalla? 
● Mitkä asiat eniten vaikuttivat päätökseesi? (valinnat paperin alalaidassa) Miksi? 
● Hyötyisitkö itse jotenkin siitä, jos joukkoliikennettä hinnoiteltaisiin tällä 
tavalla? Miksi? 
○ Vaikuttaisiko tämän kaltainen hinnoittelumalli jotenkin sinun omaan 
liikkumiseesi? 
● Miten tällainen hinnoittelumalli vaikuttaisi muihin ihmisiin? 
○ Kuka tällaisesta hinnoittelumallista mielestäsi hyötyisi eniten? 
○ Kenelle tällaisesta hinnoittelumallista olisi haittaa? 
● Mikä on tärkein nykyisen joukkoliikenteen ongelma, jonka tämä hinnoittelumalli 
mielestäsi korjaisi? 
Kiitos paljon haastattelusta: 
- Kiitoksena ajastasi HSL antaa sinulle lahjakortin, voit valita joko Stockmannin 
lahjakortin tai HSL:n 50 euron lahjakortin. 
- Onko sinulla vielä jotain kysyttävää?  
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